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ABSTRACT 
 
Financial Statement Misstatements, Auditor Litigation, and Subsequent Auditor Behavior. 
(May 2009) 
Jaime Joy Schmidt, B.S., Kansas State University; M.S., Kansas State University; 
M.S., Kansas State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael S. Wilkins 
 
 This paper examines the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to 
financial statement misstatements and the effect of auditor misstatement-based litigation 
on subsequent auditor behavior. The study is motivated by recent calls to limit auditor 
legal liability and the need to examine the ability of litigation to deter non-Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) financial reporting. I find that misstatement 
severity is the primary driver of auditor litigation. Specifically, I find that auditor 
misstatement-based litigation is more likely when the misstatement is associated with 
fraud, a regulatory investigation, a larger stock price decline, and/or a greater number of 
accounting application [i.e., Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)/GAAP) 
failures. In addition, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely to 
occur when the misstatement is associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater 
magnitude or a greater proportion of non-audit service fees. Further, I find that 
misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs’ claims are the primary drivers of 
auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based litigation. Specifically, I find that an 
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auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur 
when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a greater amount of alleged income or 
equity inflation over the class action time period, and/or a larger alleged percentage drop in 
share price over the class action time period. With respect to subsequent auditor behavior, I 
find evidence that auditor litigation results in more conservative subsequent auditor 
behavior across a litigated auditor’s office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated 
client). Specifically, in the year following auditor litigation, I find evidence that litigation 
results in increased auditor constraint of client-reported positive and signed discretionary 
accruals, as well as longer audit report lags.   
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1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to 
financial statement misstatements and the effect of auditor litigation on subsequent auditor 
behavior.  Auditor legal liability and litigation reform has been a topic of discussion since the 
late 1970s (Latham and Linville 1998). However, the recent increase in auditor litigation1 
and the collapse of Arthur Andersen has spurred debate among regulators and auditors about 
the appropriate level of auditor legal liability. Advocates for legal liability reform argue that 
auditor lawsuits are often without merit (Latham and Linville 1998) and that lawsuits may 
jeopardize the sustainability of the profession (Taub 2007). According to Cynthia Fornelli, 
executive director of the Center for Audit Quality, “It could take only one or two cases where 
settlement is not reached to threaten a[nother] firm’s existence” (Rappeport 2008). The loss 
of an additional major accounting firm could prevent public companies from obtaining timely 
audits and could therefore, significantly disrupt the global capital markets (Advisory 
Committee on the Auditing Profession 2008).    
Critics of legal liability reform argue that litigation provides a vital role in ensuring 
accountability and confidence in our financial markets (Advisory Committee on the Auditing 
Profession 2008). They argue that reductions in auditor liability would make auditors less 
vigilant and would reduce audit quality (Taub 2007). However, advocates for legal liability 
reform argue that the professional standards, PCAOB inspections, and firm-specific quality 
control practices provide adequate incentive to ensure professional auditor behavior 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 
1 A recent study by the European Commission reports that litigation costs for U.S. audit practices has risen by 
almost eight percent between 1999 and 2004 (Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 2008). 
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(Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 2008). In response to these conflicting 
views, the U.S. Treasury Department Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 
included a discussion of the role of the civil litigation system in public audits and the 
potential need for auditor legal liability reform in their comprehensive analysis of the 
condition and future of the auditing profession. However, in their final report to the U.S. 
Treasury in October 2008, the committee stated that they were unable to find a consensus on 
the issue of liability reform because there were strongly held views on both sides of the 
debate (Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 2008). This suggests that auditor 
exposure to civil litigation is an important and controversial issue and one that will be 
continually debated. My study provides insights relevant to this controversy by examining 
the determinants of litigation following financial statement misstatements and the impact of 
litigation on subsequent auditor behavior. Any evidence that litigation improves subsequent 
auditor performance would suggest that litigation does play a role in maintaining audit 
quality. 
Achieving the appropriate level of auditor legal liability requires limiting unnecessary 
litigation risk while simultaneously maintaining audit quality. Legal liability has often been 
viewed as a deterrence mechanism against non-GAAP2 financial reporting (Palmrose and 
Scholz 2004). Similarly, auditor legal liability may also be viewed as a deterrent for 
substandard audit quality. In this paper, I investigate the non-GAAP deterrence effect of 
auditor litigation in two ways. First, I use annual financial statement misstatements to proxy 
for audit failures, and I examine the circumstances through which misstatements result in 
                                                 
2 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 
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auditor litigation and/or auditor settlements.3 Second, I examine the effect of auditor 
litigation on subsequent auditor behavior. Specifically, I examine the effect of prior litigation 
on the likelihood that auditors employed at a litigated office constrain client discretionary 
accruals (DAC) and lengthen the audit report lag (ARL) across their office-wide client 
portfolio (that excludes the litigated client).  Changes in auditor behavior resulting from prior 
litigation would consequently affect financial statement quality and thus, may have a non-
GAAP deterrence effect on auditors.4 In addition, positive changes in auditor behavior would 
indicate that auditor litigation does play an important role in improving and/or maintaining 
audit quality. 
 I find that several measures of misstatement severity are positively associated with 
the likelihood that a misstatement results in auditor litigation. Specifically, I find that auditor 
litigation is more likely to follow misstatements that are associated with fraud, regulatory 
investigations, and/or larger stock price declines at the misstatement disclosure date. In 
addition, I find that litigation is more likely to follow misstatements associated with a greater 
number of accounting rule application (i.e. FASB/GAAP5) failures, especially when the 
failures involve revenue recognition. These findings are similar to those of Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004), who find that core restatements (i.e. misstatements of earnings from primary 
operations), more pervasive restatements (i.e. misstatements involving more accounting 
                                                 
3 I exclude quarterly misstatements because Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) require annual 
(quarterly) financial statements to be audited (reviewed).  Thus, annual misstatements are a better proxy for 
audit failures. 
4 Because financial statements are the joint product of management and auditor decisions, it is difficult to 
directly examine the effect of auditor behavior changes on the adherence of financial statements to GAAP.  
Consistent with prior literature, I rely on discretionary accruals as my measure for changes in financial 
statement quality which ultimately contribute to GAAP compliance.  I do not examine subsequent non-GAAP 
reporting (i.e. misstatements) because I am predominantly interested in changes in auditor behavior that 
ultimately impact GAAP compliance.  While misstatements may be the best measure of GAAP compliance, 
their occurrence is often driven by the actions of several parties including management, auditors, and those 
charged with overseeing the financial reporting process.  My primary interest is in the actions of auditors that 
comprise one component of GAAP compliance. 
5 Financial Accounting Standards Board. 
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issues), and misstatements disclosing the presence of fraud or irregularities are associated 
with auditor litigation.   
With respect to auditor characteristics, I find that auditor misstatement-based 
litigation is more likely when the misstatement is associated with engagement fees that 
consist of a greater magnitude or a greater proportion of non-audit service fees. This result 
suggests that non-audit fees may affect the plaintiff’s perception of auditor independence and 
audit quality associated with an accounting misstatement.6 However, my tests also reveal that 
this relationship only exists in the post-Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) time period. Thus, the 
perception of non-audit services to impair independence directly corresponds with the SOX 
prohibition of certain non-audit services.7 This suggests that the SOX emphasis on the 
potential of non-audit services to impair auditor independence may have consequently 
affected how non-audit services are viewed by marketplace participants. In addition, my tests 
do not reveal that auditor tenure is associated with the likelihood that a misstatement will 
result in auditor litigation. However, my tests do reveal that, after controlling for other 
determinants, misstatements by Big N auditors are less likely to result in litigation than 
misstatements by non-Big N auditors. These findings suggest that the perception that longer 
auditor-client relationships are associated with higher quality audits may not apply to 
litigation associated with misstatements. However, the perception that Big N auditors provide 
                                                 
6 For example, in Kmart Corporation court documents, the plaintiff uses financial reliance, primarily in the form 
of non-audit fees, as evidence for PricewaterhouseCoopers’ participation in the material false and misleading 
financial statements [D.E. & J. Ltd. P’ship v. Conaway, et als., No. 02-70684 at 56 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(Plaintiff’s consolidated amended complaint)]. 
7 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 prohibits audit firms from providing any of the following services to a 
publicly traded audit client: (1) bookkeeping and related services; (2) design or implementation of financial 
information systems; (3) appraisal or valuation services; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit outsourcing; (6) 
management or human resources services; (7) investment or broker/dealer services; (8) legal and expert services 
(SOX 2002). 
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higher quality audits than non-Big N auditors may apply to litigation associated with 
misstatements.   
With respect to client characteristics, I find that the likelihood that a misstatement 
results in auditor litigation is greater (smaller) for larger (older) clients and greater for those 
clients that file for bankruptcy within a year following the misstatement. These results are 
similar to Carcello and Palmrose (1994) and suggest that larger clients may either have more 
shareholders who are willing to pursue litigation or may have suffered a greater total loss to 
incentivize the pursuit of litigation. These results also suggest that shareholders of older 
clients may have less incentive to pursue auditor litigation. Finally, consistent with the prior 
literature, these results indicate that client bankruptcy is a frequent source of auditor litigation 
(e.g., Palmrose 1987; Carcello and Palmrose 2004).   
I then investigate the circumstances where auditor misstatement-based litigation 
results in an auditor settlement. I find that misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs’ 
claims are the primary drivers of auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based 
litigation.  Specifically, I find that misstatement-based litigation is more likely to result in an 
auditor settlement when the misstatement involves fraud. However, I do not find the other 
measures of misstatement severity to be positively associated with the likelihood of an 
auditor settlement. Rather, I find that misstatement-based litigation is more likely to result in 
an auditor settlement when the amount of alleged income or equity inflation is greater and/or 
when the alleged percentage drop in share price over the class action period is more severe. 
These results are consistent with those members of the Advisory Committee who favor 
auditor legal liability reform and who believe that audit “firms are forced to settle 
cases…because the size of the claims mean that if the firm does not prevail at trial, the 
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resulting award could destroy the firm” (Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 
2008, VII:27).    
In addition, I find that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based 
litigation is less likely in the post-SOX time period and when there is a greater diffusion of 
shareholders. These results suggest that the majority of settlements occurred prior to SOX 
and that a greater diffusion of shareholders makes an agreed-upon settlement more difficult 
to obtain. I also find that auditor settlements are more likely to result from misstatements 
issued by clients who recently issued an IPO. This suggests that the increased liability burden 
that auditors must bear under the Securities Act of 1933 affects the likelihood of an auditor to 
settle misstatement-based litigation.8 I do not find any of the other auditor characteristics to 
be associated with an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation in the 
hypothesized direction. These insignificant results suggest that the characteristics of the 
auditor (e.g., engagement fees, auditor tenure, and auditor size) may be less important in 
predicting the likelihood that an auditor settlement results from misstatement-based litigation 
than in predicting the likelihood that auditor litigation results from a financial statement 
misstatement.9 In sum, my first contribution to prior literature is an investigation of the 
relationship between various auditor, misstatement, and client characteristics associated with 
misstatements and the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation.  
With respect to the effect of litigation on subsequent auditor behavior, I find evidence 
that auditors engage in more conservative behavior following litigation. Specifically, I find 
that in the year following litigation, auditors employed at a litigated office are more likely 
than auditors not employed at a litigated office to constrain signed and positive discretionary 
                                                 
8 Auditors are liable for any level of negligence under the Securities Act of 1933 whereas auditors are only 
liable for scienter or gross negligence under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Act of 1934. 
9 However, this conclusion is tenuous because it relies on a null finding. 
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accruals across their office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client).10 My 
results suggest that, following litigation, auditors require more conservative financial 
reporting from their clients predominantly by constraining client income-increasing financial 
reporting behavior.11 In addition to the discretionary accruals results, I find that, in the year 
following litigation, auditors employed at a litigated office have longer post-litigation audit 
report lags than do auditors not employed at a litigated office. These findings suggest that 
litigation increases the amount of time auditors spend on subsequent audit engagements 
(again, across the auditor’s office-wide client portfolio that excludes the litigated client).12 
Overall, my findings suggest that, with respect to the reporting of accruals and the time spent 
on an audit, auditor litigation does have a significant effect on subsequent auditor behavior. 
My findings should be of interest to regulators and auditors. Specifically, when 
assessing the current level of auditor legal liability, regulators may wish to understand the 
circumstances under which auditors are held liable for past audit failures and how litigation 
may affect subsequent auditor behavior (which ultimately may impact financial reporting 
quality). Because of the reputational and financial costs of lawsuits, auditors may wish to 
understand the extent to which auditor and misstatement characteristics affect auditor 
liability and the likelihood of an auditor settlement.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss 
related research and develop my hypotheses. The third section describes the data and my 
                                                 
10 My empirical tests exclude clients that were involved in the auditor litigation because I am interested in a 
widespread increase in auditor conservatism across an auditor’s portfolio of clients not associated with the 
initial litigation.  
11 However, my results are limited to a matching procedure that assigns a non-litigated auditor to a litigated 
auditor based on total clients audited in the year prior to litigation. 
12 However, my results are limited to a matching procedure that assigns a non-litigated auditor to a litigated 
auditor based on total assets audited in the year prior to litigation. 
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sample selection procedures. Following that, I present my methodology, model development, 
and variable definitions. Finally, I present the empirical results and conclude.  
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CHAPTER II 
RELATED RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Auditor Litigation 
 Financial statements are the primary means by which detailed financial information is 
communicated to those outside the company. Prior research suggests that financial statements 
are the joint product of decisions made by the auditor and by company management (Antle 
and Nalbuff 1991). The auditor enhances financial reporting quality by detecting material 
errors and omissions before the financial statements are issued. A misstatement is the failure 
of an auditor to detect a material error or omission in the financial statements. A restatement 
is the subsequent detection, disclosure, and correction of a prior period misstatement. As 
such, a restatement is: (1) an acknowledgement that previously issued financial statements 
did not comply with GAAP; and (2) an indication of an audit failure because GAAS requires 
an auditor to detect material errors and omissions in financial statements prior to their 
issuance.13   
Litigation is a potential costly consequence of an audit failure, yet not all audit 
failures result in litigation (Carcello and Palmrose 1994; Palmrose and Scholz 2004). The 
ability of litigation to deter non-GAAP financial reporting associated with substandard audits 
can only occur when litigation acts as a mechanism holding auditors accountable for past 
audit failures.  Prior behavioral research indicates that accountability, or the prospect of 
accountability, increases the vigilance of auditors (Nelson and Tan 2005). Thus, the 
                                                 
13 However, an auditor is required to provide reasonable assurance rather than absolute assurance that financial 
statements do not contain material errors or omissions. 
10 
 
 
 
occurrence of litigation associated with substandard audits is necessary if auditors are to 
perceive litigation or the threat of litigation as a mechanism by which they are held 
accountable. In this paper, I use a financial statement misstatement, defined as a subsequently 
restated 10-K, as my proxy for an audit failure. I investigate the characteristics of a financial 
statement misstatement associated with subsequent auditor litigation. This approach allows 
me to identify the circumstances under which auditors are held liable for a past misstatement 
and the circumstances under which litigation may have the potential to act as a future non-
GAAP deterrence mechanism for auditors. 
 Prior research has examined the characteristics of audited financial statements that are 
associated with auditor litigation (Stice 1991; Henninger 2001; Lys and Watts 2004), but 
these studies do not condition on actual audit failures. Specifically, these studies match a 
sample of firm-year financial statement observations that resulted in litigation to a sample of 
firm-year financial statement observations that did not result in litigation without examining 
whether or not the financial statements were misstated. Overall, these studies find that client 
size, financial condition, prior stock price changes, abnormal discretionary accruals, and 
various auditor characteristics (e.g. audit revenues, applied audit technology, and the audit 
opinion) are significantly associated with auditor litigation (St. Pierre and Anderson 1984; 
Stice 1991; Carcello and Palmrose 1994; Lys and Watts 1994; Henninger 2001). My study 
differs in that it conditions on an observable audit failure (i.e., misstatement) so that I may 
examine the characteristics associated with auditor liability when an audit failure is already 
known. 
Carcello and Palmrose (1994) conduct a study where they condition on bankruptcy 
and investigate the client and auditor characteristics that affect the likelihood of auditor 
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litigation. They find that auditor litigation is more likely for clients who do not receive going 
concern audit opinions (GCO) prior to bankruptcy, for larger clients, for clients with SEC 
enforcement actions, and for clients with net income on their last pre-bankruptcy financial 
statements. My study differs in that I condition on an observed audit failure (i.e., 
misstatement) rather than bankruptcy, and I include various characteristics that describe and 
partition auditors (e.g., engagement fees and auditor tenure). Generally accepted auditing 
standards require an auditor to evaluate the going concern capability of a client and issue a 
modified opinion (i.e., GCO) if the auditor has substantial doubt about the client’s ability to 
remain financially viable for one year following the client’s fiscal year-end (AICPA 1988). 
While the failure of an auditor to issue a GCO to a subsequently bankrupt company is often 
associated with subsequent litigation (Carcello and Palmrose 1994), it is not a clear audit 
failure. Rather, the failure of an auditor to make the going concern assessment would 
constitute an audit failure. Thus, my study examines an actual audit failure (i.e., financial 
statement misstatement) and the circumstances where a financial statement misstatement 
results in auditor litigation and/or an auditor settlement in order to determine when litigation 
might have the potential to act as a future non-GAAP deterrence mechanism for auditors. 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004) conduct a study similar to mine where they condition on 
misstatements and investigate the characteristics of the misstatements that affect the 
likelihood of auditor litigation. They find that core restatements (i.e. those associated with 
earnings from primary operations), restatements involving fraud or irregularities, 
restatements with a greater number of accounting issues, restatements with a greater stock 
price decline at the disclosure date, and restatements issued by clients experiencing a recent 
12 
 
 
 
IPO are more likely to result in auditor litigation.14 The first part of my study extends their 
analysis by adding various characteristics that describe and partition auditors (e.g., 
engagement fees and auditor tenure). These characteristics are important because prior 
research suggests that auditor tenure (Ghosh and Moon 2005) and engagement fees (Gul 
1991; Hay et al. 2006) affect a third party’s perception of audit quality. Thus, I expect that 
differences in auditor tenure and engagement fees may affect perceived audit quality and 
therefore, may affect the responsibility assigned to an auditor for a past misstatement. My 
study extends the literature on auditor litigation by investigating whether or not various 
auditor characteristics affect auditor culpability for past misstatements. 
Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior 
 While the occurrence of litigation may have the potential to deter non-GAAP 
financial reporting, there is no known empirical evidence that litigation does, indeed, deter 
non-GAAP financial reporting.15 For litigation to have this effect, it must affect the 
subsequent actions and choices of auditors (Latham and Linville 1998). Because prior 
research suggests that financial statements are the joint product of decisions made by the 
auditor and by company management (Antle and Nalbuff 1991), any changes in auditor 
behavior that result from litigation should ultimately affect the quality of subsequent 
financial statements. In this paper, I investigate the effect of auditor litigation on subsequent 
auditor behavior.16 
                                                 
14 Restatements are the subsequently disclosed and corrected prior period misstatements. 
15 However, (Chang et al. 2008) find that auditor disciplinary actions in Taiwan result in more conservative 
subsequent auditor behavior as evidenced by a constraint in client-reported discretionary accruals. 
16 My study is limited in that it does not directly examine the effect of changes in auditor behavior on 
subsequent GAAP compliance.  Rather, it relies on discretionary accruals as its measure of changes in financial 
statement quality that ultimately contribute to GAAP compliance. 
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 Prior empirical research examines the effect of legal liability and litigation risk on 
auditor behavior.  Lee and Mande (2003) examine the effect of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) on client reported discretionary accruals. The 
PSLRA reduced auditor liability by replacing joint and several liability with proportionate 
liability. Lee and Mande (2003) find that income-increasing discretionary accruals for Big-6 
audit clients rose following the passage of the PSLRA. They suggest that the legal liability 
reform of the PSLRA reduced audit quality. Cahan and Zhang (2006) examine the effect of 
increased litigation risk of ex-Andersen clients on successor auditor behavior. After 
controlling for other litigation risk factors, they find that successor auditors required more 
conservative accounting from ex-Andersen clients through lower levels and larger decreases 
in abnormal accruals. In sum, their results suggest that litigation risk invokes more 
conservative auditor behavior. I extend this literature by controlling for litigation risk factors 
and investigate if actual litigation results in more conservative subsequent auditor behavior. 
 Prior analytical research also examines the effect of legal liability and litigation 
exposure on audit quality. Balachandran and Nagarajan (1987) find that alternative legal 
systems (i.e., strict liability versus negligence) can impact the level of due care chosen by an 
auditor, but this level of care is also dependent on the auditor’s perception of a client’s 
financial condition. Thoman (1996) finds that additional legal exposure can induce auditors 
to either increase audit effort or report more conservatively. Latham and Linville (1998, 201) 
state that “…although several analytical pieces examine the effect of litigation on audit 
quality, additional empirical verification of the models’ results would be helpful.” My study 
addresses this need by empirically examining the effect of auditor misstatement-based 
litigation on auditor reporting decisions and audit effort. Specifically, I investigate two 
14 
 
 
 
subsequent auditor behaviors: (1) the likelihood of auditors to constrain client-reported 
discretionary accruals, and (2) the length of the audit report lag.  
Hypothesis Development 
Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Auditor Litigation 
While prior research has examined the circumstances in which financial statement 
misstatements result in auditor litigation, my study extends the literature by adding various 
characteristics that describe and partition auditors (i.e., engagement fees and auditor tenure). 
First, I investigate whether the amount or proportion of non-audit fees charged by an engaged 
auditor affects auditor culpability for past misstatements. Prior literature provides mixed 
evidence regarding the effect of non-audit services on auditor performance (e.g., DeFond et 
al. 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003); however, prior literature indicates that 
engagement fees do affect the perception of auditor independence and auditor performance 
(Gul 1991; Hay et al. 2006). I examine both the magnitude of non-audit service fees and the 
proportion of total engagement fees that consist of non-audit service fees because both may 
affect the perception of auditor independence. A greater magnitude of non-audit service fees 
may indicate a failure of an auditor to maintain economic independence. A greater proportion 
of engagement fees that consist of non-audit engagement fees may indicate a failure of an 
auditor to maintain managerial independence.17 If third parties believe that an auditor has 
failed to maintain an independent mindset during an audit, they may be more inclined to 
assign blame to an auditor for a past misstatement. Second, I examine auditor tenure to assess 
whether the positive relationship between auditor tenure and perceived audit quality (Ghosh 
                                                 
17 AICPA Code of Professional Conduct Rule 101 states that an auditor must maintain independence by not 
having a direct financial interest in a client and by not performing management functions on behalf of a client 
(AICPA 2006). 
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and Moon 2005) influences auditor culpability for past misstatements. This leads me to my 
first two formal hypotheses (stated in the alternative form): 
H1: The likelihood that auditor litigation results from a past financial statement 
misstatement is greater when the misstatement involves engagement fees that 
consist of a greater magnitude or a greater proportion of non-audit service 
fees. 
 
H2: The likelihood that auditor litigation results from a past financial statement 
misstatement is greater when the misstatement involves a shorter auditor-
client relationship. 
 
Misstatement-based Litigation Resulting in an Auditor Settlement 
My study also extends the literature by modeling the factors that affect the likelihood 
that litigation associated with a past financial statement misstatement results in an auditor 
settlement. Advocates for auditor legal liability reform argue that audit firms are often forced 
to settle lawsuits regardless of the merit of the plaintiffs’ claims because the size of the 
claims are so large that an unsuccessful resolution would unduly jeopardize the viability of 
the firm (Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 2008). I investigate this argument 
by examining the incremental effect of the size of the claims, the severity of the 
misstatement, and various auditor characteristics (e.g., engagement fees, auditor tenure, and 
auditor size) on the likelihood that the auditor pays a settlement in a lawsuit resulting from a 
misstatement. While Palmrose and Scholz (2004) provides descriptive statistics of auditor 
resolution amounts and a summary of multivariate regression results, to my knowledge, this 
is the first study that presents a multivariate model that examines the incremental effect of 
the size of plaintiff’s claims on the likelihood that an auditor defendant pays a settlement in a 
lawsuit resulting from a misstatement. Because the prior literature is inconclusive as to 
whether or not the merits of a lawsuit matter with respect to auditor litigation (Palmrose 
1997), I am primarily interested in whether it is the size of the plaintiffs’ claims or the 
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characteristics of the misstatement that drive auditor settlements. While all misstatements 
represent an alleged audit failure, I expect that misstatement-based litigation that places a 
greater amount of audit firm resources at risk are more likely to be settled. As noted 
previously, because advocates for auditor legal liability reform argue that it is the size of the 
plaintiffs’ claims that drive auditor settlements (Advisory Committee on the Auditing 
Profession 2008), I expect a positive association between the size of the plaintiff’s claims and 
the likelihood that auditor litigation resulting from a misstatement results in an auditor 
settlement. This leads me to my third formal hypothesis (stated in the alternative form): 
H3: An auditor settlement is more likely to result from auditor misstatement-
based litigation when the size of the plaintiffs’ claims is larger. 
 
Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior 
Prior research defines auditor conservatism as an “auditor’s preference for income-
decreasing accounting choices” (Kim et al. 2003, 327) and indicates that auditor litigation is 
more likely to result from an auditor’s failure to behave conservatively (St. Pierre and 
Anderson 1984). Thoman (1996) finds that additional legal exposure can induce auditors to 
either report more conservatively or increase audit effort. Thus, I predict that litigation will 
induce auditors18, in all subsequent audit engagements, to engage in more conservative 
behavior by monitoring and reducing management’s reporting flexibility (i.e., reducing client 
reported discretionary accruals) and increasing the amount of time spent on audit 
engagements (i.e., lengthening the audit report lag). This section describes my formal 
hypotheses related to these auditor behaviors.   
Accrual-based earnings involve estimates about future events and are jointly affected 
by client and auditor preferences. These estimates about future events introduce estimation 
                                                 
18 My analysis is conducted at the auditor city (i.e., audit office) level rather than the national (i.e., audit firm 
name) level because the occurrence of litigation would not vary at the national level. 
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error because clients and auditors have conflicting incentives. Clients have an incentive to 
use accruals to manage earnings19, whereas auditors must decide on the appropriate level of 
accruals that are consistent with GAAP.  I examine the likelihood that auditors constrain 
client reported discretionary accruals because prior research shows that accruals are often 
associated with the incidence of subsequent litigation (Lys and Watts 1994; Heninger 2001) 
and because auditors have an incentive to require more conservative accruals when litigation 
risk is high (DeFond and Subramyam 1998). Thus, I predict that litigation will induce 
auditors to engage in more conservative behavior evidenced by additional monitoring and 
reduction of management’s reporting flexibility (i.e., reducing client reported discretionary 
accruals) in subsequent audit engagements. Because Henninger (2001) finds that the 
probability of subsequent auditor litigation increases as a client reports more income-
increasing discretionary accruals, I predict that auditors employed at a litigated office will 
constrain income-increasing and signed discretionary accruals across their office-wide client 
portfolio (that excludes the litigated client) in order to avoid future litigation. I also examine 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals because Klein (2002) suggests that this measure 
should capture the magnitude of financial reporting decisions regardless of the directional 
effect of those decisions. While auditors may be primarily interested in constraining income-
increasing behavior, they may also be inclined to constrain all discretionary behavior.20 This 
leads me to my fourth formal hypothesis (stated in the alternative form): 
H4: Following litigation, the magnitude of positive, signed, and absolute value 
discretionary accruals reported by clients of litigated auditors is smaller than 
the magnitude of positive, signed, and absolute value discretionary accruals 
reported by clients of non-litigated auditors.   
                                                 
19 This assertion relies on the assumption that accruals are opportunistically manipulated by management.  It is 
possible that accruals represent a signal from management regarding future prospects. 
20 Client income-decreasing discretionary behavior can lead to “cookie-jar” reserve accounting that may unduly 
smooth net income and mislead financial investors about the true financial performance of the company.  
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In addition to investigating the effect of litigation on the constraint of client accruals, 
I also examine the effect of litigation on the audit report lag (ARL). The ARL represents the 
length of time auditors require to complete an audit (Bamber et al. 1993). Consistent with 
prior research, I define the ARL as the number of days between a client’s fiscal year-end and 
the audit report date (Ashton et al. 1987; Ashton et al. 1989; Bamber et al. 1993). Prior 
research provides evidence that the ARL increases with audit complexity and risk. 
Specifically, prior research shows that, on average, the ARL is positively associated with 
qualified audit opinions (Whittred 1980: Bamber et al. 1993), restatements of prior period 
financial statements (Kinney and McDaniel 1993), losses (Ashton et al. 1989; Bamber et al. 
1993), and extraordinary items (Ashton et al. 1989; Bamber et al. 1993). I control for these 
audit and client characteristics known to increase the ARL, and I predict that litigation will 
induce auditors employed at a litigated office to lengthen the ARL across their office-wide 
client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client). A lengthening of the ARL would suggest 
that litigated auditors are spending more time (and perhaps are exercising more caution) in 
completing their audits. This leads me to my fifth formal hypothesis (stated in the alternative 
form): 
H5: Following litigation, the ARL for clients of litigated auditors is longer than 
the ARL for clients of non-litigated auditors.  
 
In sum, I predict that litigation will result in more conservative auditor behavior. Because 
financial reports are a joint product of decisions made by the auditor and company 
management, changes in auditor behavior should ultimately affect overall financial reporting 
quality. If observed changes in auditor behavior, specifically more conservative auditor 
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behavior, improve financial statement quality then this may suggest that litigation deters – at 
least to some extent – non-GAAP financial reporting.21  
                                                 
21 It is difficult to directly examine the effect of changes in auditor behavior on financial reporting quality.  I 
rely on discretionary accruals as my measure of changes in financial statement quality. 
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CHAPTER III 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Auditor Litigation 
I identify all annual financial statement misstatements from the Audit Analytics 
database using restatements of previously audited annual financial statements disclosed from 
January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2007.  Using audit opinion data available from the 
Audit Analytics database, I identify the engaged auditor during the misstated time period. 
Because misstated time periods often cover multiple fiscal year-ends, I retain only one 
unique firm-year observation per misstatement and assume that the auditor engaged at the 
end of the misstated time period is the auditor most likely to be sued.22 My initial 
misstatement sample consists of 1,673 observations with the data necessary to run my tests.23 
I use the Audit Analytics database to identify all instances of auditor litigation 
disclosed as of June 18, 2008.24 The Audit Analytics database provides material legal 
proceedings and federal litigation filed against the top 100 accounting firms. I read each 
proceeding and limit my sample to litigation that alleges the financial statements to be 
misleading25, where the company Central Index Key (i.e., CIK) identifier and litigation date 
                                                 
22The auditor engaged at the end of the misstated time period is the auditor sued in five of six lawsuits in my 
litigation sample where multiple auditors are engaged during the misstated time period. 
23I use the Audit Analytics, Compustat, CRSP, and Thompson Financial SDC databases to obtain the data 
necessary to construct my control variables. 
24 I limited my analysis to auditor litigation listed in the following Audit Analytics categories: Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement; Accounting malpractice; Ch 11 and Ch 7 bankruptcy; Class action; Financial reporting; 
IPO; Mergers & acquisitions; Professional liability; Other securities law; Stockholder suits.  Several lawsuits 
were duplicated and categorized in several locations.  I retained only one occurrence of the lawsuit and 
eliminated any lawsuit where the auditor was not listed as a defendant on the court docket. 
25 My screen eliminates litigation resulting from employer-employee relations, auditor-client contractual 
disagreements, and independence concerns. 
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could be determined26, and where the auditor affected by litigation is located within the 
United States. Thus, my final empirical sample is summarized in Table 1 and consists of 65 
misstatements (3.9 percent) that result in litigation and 1,608 misstatements (96.1 percent) 
that do not result in litigation. 
Misstatement-based Litigation Resulting in Auditor Settlements 
In order to examine the resolution of the auditor litigation, I use the Audit Analytics 
database and the Stanford Law School Class Action Clearinghouse to identify which auditor 
lawsuits resulted in an auditor settlement. Of the 65 auditor lawsuits, the outcome of 13 
lawsuits could not be determined. In these instances, the court proceedings suggested that the 
lawsuit reached resolution. However, the court documents were unclear as to whether or not 
an auditor settlement was reached. Therefore, I eliminate these lawsuits from my analysis. I 
then read each proceeding to identify the plaintiffs’ alleged equity, income, or stock inflation. 
In two instances, the plaintiffs’ claims could not be determined. I eliminate these lawsuits 
from my analysis. Thus, my final empirical sample is summarized in Table 1 and consists of 
20 auditor misstatement-based lawsuits (40 percent) that result in an auditor settlement and 
30 auditor misstatement-based lawsuits (60 percent) that do not result in an auditor 
settlement. 
                                                 
26 The CIK identifier is necessary so that I can identify which misstatements resulted in litigation. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection: 
Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Litigation and/or Auditor Settlements 
 
Sample #1: Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Litigation2 
 
                                                                                                     Frequency 
 
 
Percent of 
Total 
Annual misstatements disclosed as restatements in the 
Audit Analytics database from 1/1/01 – 12/31/07  
 
1,673 
 
 
 
 
Annual misstatements that resulted in litigation as 
disclosed in the Audit Analytics database as of 
1/22/08: 65 
 
 
 
3.9 
 
 
Sample #2: Auditor Misstatement-Based Litigation Resulting in an 
Auditor Settlement 
 
                                                                                                      Frequency 
 
 
 
 
 
Percent of 
Total 
Annual misstatements that resulted in litigation as 
disclosed in the Audit Analytics database as of 
1/22/08:  
 
65 
 
 
 
 
Less: Auditor misstatement-based litigation where the 
outcome could not be determined4: 
 
Less: Auditor misstatement-based litigation where the 
alleged equity, income, or stock inflation could 
not be identified in the lawsuit: 
 
Auditor misstatement-based litigation that resulted in an 
auditor settlement as of 10/13/083: 
 
 
Final Empirical Sample 
 
  
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
2 
20 
50 
                                                 
2 My empirical tests require data from the Compustat, CRSP, and Thomson Financial SDC databases.  My 
sample consists of only observations with data available from these databases. 
4 The available court documents suggest that the lawsuit reached resolution.  However, the court documents 
were unclear as to whether or not an auditor settlement was reached. 
3 I utilized the Audit Analytics database and the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse to 
identify auditor settlements. 
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Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior 
 The second part of my study is conducted at the auditor city (i.e., audit office) level, 
and my empirical tests examine the subsequent auditor behavior associated with all clients 
(except the litigated client) serviced by a given office. In other words, my tests are aimed at 
determining whether litigation involving Auditor A and Client B is associated with changes 
in Auditor A’s behavior across Auditor A’s office-wide client portfolio (excluding Client B) 
in the year following litigation. Ball (2008) suggests that the penalties of a scandal resulting 
from poor audit office-level oversight typically fall on one or more partners but do not 
threaten the entire audit firm. Thus, my study focuses on auditor behavior at the audit office 
level. Prior literature finds an increase in financial reporting conservatism since the passage 
of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002 (Lobo and Zhou 2006; Cohen et al. 2008). Because my 
sample of auditor litigation is comprised of lawsuits between 2000 and 2007, I use a 
matched-pairs design to control for the increase in auditor conservatism over this time period. 
Specifically, I match a litigated auditor to a similarly-sized non-litigated auditor, and I 
compare the behavior of both auditors across their office-wide client portfolios (excluding 
the litigated client) in the year following litigation.  
To begin my analysis, I first use the Audit Analytics database to identify the auditor 
city location for the auditors represented in my litigation sample. My litigation sample 
consists of 65 misstatements. In four instances, two separate company misstatements are 
combined into a single lawsuit against one auditor. Thus, my initial sample consists of 61 
unique auditor city locations cited with misstatement-based litigation. I then identify a 
control sample of similarly sized non-litigated auditors using one of three different match 
criteria. First, I match each audit office cited with misstatement-based litigation (i.e., litigated 
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auditor) to a similarly sized audit office not cited with litigation (i.e., non-litigated auditor) 
based on the total assets audited in the year prior to litigation.27 Second, I rematch the 
litigated auditors to non-litigated auditors based on total clients audited in the year prior to 
litigation. Lastly, I rematch the litigated auditors to non-litigated auditors based on total 
assets audited in the year prior to litigation but I also require the control (i.e. non-litigated) 
auditor to be of the same firm name. In sum, in three separate analyses, I match a litigated 
auditor to a non-litigated auditor with a similar office size in the prior year.28 These matches 
are based on auditor size because I want my litigated and non-litigated auditors to have 
similar resources, personnel, and audit workload so that my empirical tests will have the best 
chance of isolating differences in auditor behavior that are attributable to litigation. My third 
match is structured to control for firm-wide effects litigation may have on auditor behavior. I 
eliminate three litigated auditor office locations from the analysis because they are missing 
prior year data necessary for the matching procedures. I also eliminate six litigated auditor 
office locations from the analysis because they are cited with multiple lawsuits and it would 
be difficult to isolate behavior changes separately around each lawsuit.29 I require my control  
                                                 
27 Using the Audit Analytics database, I review all available auditor litigation and ensure that my control offices 
are without any litigation (not just misstatement-based litigation). 
28 If an audit office is the closest in size to multiple litigated offices, I assign it to the litigated office most 
similar in size (i.e. with the smallest absolute value difference in total assets audited in the prior year).  I then 
take the next best match for the remaining litigated office.  This prevents control office observations from 
entering my empirical models more than once. 
29 I include these auditor office locations in subsequent sensitivity analyses. 
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audit offices to audit between 50 and 150 percent of the total assets audited by my litigated 
audit offices. This screen eliminates four litigated and non-litigated audit offices from my 
sample.30 My final auditor sample is summarized in Table 2 and consists of 41 litigated audit 
offices matched to 41 non-litigated audit offices.31  
Next, I collect all financial statements issued by clients engaged by the litigated and 
non-litigated audit offices in the year prior and subsequent to the litigation commencement 
date.32 I eliminate from my sample any financial statements issued by clients involved in the 
litigation because I expect auditor behavior to be more conservative for these clients and I do 
not want these observations to drive my results. Instead, I aim to examine the effect of 
litigation on auditor reporting behavior for all other clients. My final empirical sample 
consists of the client-year observations between 2000 and 2007 (both one year prior to and 
one year subsequent to litigation) with available Audit Analytics and Compustat data to run 
each of my empirical tests.33   
                                                 
30 This screen eliminate ten litigated and non-litigated audit offices under my third matching procedure that 
requires the non-litigated office to have the same audit firm name. 
31 My final auditor sample consists of 35 litigated audit offices matched to 35 non-litigated audit offices under 
my third matching procedure that requires the non-litigated audit office to have the same audit firm name. 
32 I vary this time span in subsequent sensitivity analyses. 
33 The number of observations will vary according to data availability for each of my empirical models. 
Consistent with prior literature (Frankel et al. 2002; Cahan and Zhang 2006), I exclude all observations with 
two-digit SIC codes 60 – 69 from the accruals analysis.  
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TABLE 2 
Sample Selection:  
Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior 
 
Panel A: Litigated Auditor Sample  
Selection 
Match #1: 
Total 
Assets 
Match #2: 
Total 
Clients 
Match #3: 
Total Assets 
and Firm 
Name 
Auditor office locations affected by 
misstatement-based litigation as disclosed 
in Audit Analytics as of 12/31/0734 
 
61 
 
61 
 
61 
 
Less: Auditor office locations with missing 
prior year data necessary for matching 
procedures (3) 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
Less: Six auditor office locations cited with 
multiple lawsuits35 (13) 
 
 
(13) 
 
 
(13) 
 
Less: Auditor office locations without a 
similarly sized non-litigated audit 
office3 (4) 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
 
(10) 
 
 Final sample of litigated auditor office 
locations:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 In four instances, two separate misstatements are combined into a single lawsuit against an auditor.  As a 
result, only 61 unique office locations are affected by misstatement-based litigation.   
35 One auditor office location was cited with three lawsuits. 
3 I require my control audit office to audit between 50 – 150 percent of the total assets (clients) audited by my 
litigated office. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Auditor Litigation 
In this section, I discuss the empirical models I use to test my predictions. First, I 
estimate the following logistic regression model to investigate the occurrence of auditor 
litigation related to financial statement misstatements:  
Litig = β0 + β1 Fees + β2 Tenure + β3 BigN + β4 Sox + β5 Revenue + β6 Num_Issues +   (1) 
β7 Fraud + β8 Misstate_Length + β9 Price_Change + β10 Reg_Invest +  
β11 Time_Lapse + β12 Client_Size + β13 Bankrupt_Delist + β14 Merger +  
β15 IPO + β16 Sales_Growth + β17 Lit_Ind + β18 Receivables_Ratio +  
β19 Inventory_Ratio + β20 Client_Age + β21 Share_Diffusion + β22-28 ∑i=17 Years + 
ε                  
 
where: 
 
Litig = an indicator set to 1 if the misstatement36 results in auditor litigation 
in any subsequent year, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Auditor Characteristics: 
 
Fees = the natural logarithm of the total non-audit fees (LFees) or the ratio 
of non-audit fees to total fees (Fee_Ratio) charged to the client in the 
misstated fiscal year; 
 
Tenure = the number of consecutive years the client had retained their current 
auditor as of the misstatement date; 
 
BigN  = an indicator set to 1 if the auditor engaged during the misstatement 
was a Big N auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Sox = an indicator set to 1 if the restatement is disclosed after July 31, 
2002, and 0 otherwise; 
 
                                                 
36 I identify restatements of annual financial statement disclosed from January 1, 2000 through December, 31, 
2007 in the Audit Analytics database and determine which prior year’s financial statements were misstated.  
The misstatement is determined by the date on the initial financial statements rather than by the date of the 
restatement.   
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Misstatement Characteristics: 
 
Revenue  = an indicator set to 1 if the misstatement includes a revenue 
recognition issue, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Num_Issues  = the number of accounting rule (i.e., FASB/GAAP) application 
failures identified in the misstatement; 
 
Fraud  = an indicator set to 1 if the misstatement includes fraud, 
irregularities, or misrepresentations, and 0 otherwise;  
 
Misstate_Length  = the number of days between the misstatement period beginning and 
ending date; 
 
Price_Change = the three-day market-adjusted return around the misstatement 
disclosure date based on a value-weighted market index37; 
 
Reg_Invest = an indicator set to 1 if the SEC, PCAOB, or another regulatory body 
is investigating the registrant, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Time_Lapse = the number of days between the restatement disclosure date and the 
misstatement period ending date; 
 
Client Characteristics: 
 
Client_Size = the natural logarithm of the client’s total assets; 
 
Bankrupt_Delist = an indicator set to 1 if the client went bankrupt or delisted from the 
stock exchange within 365 days of the issuance of the misstated 
financial statements, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Merger = an indicator set to 1 if the client went through a merger in the year 
prior to the misstatement, and 0 otherwise; 
 
IPO = an indicator set to 1 if the client issued an IPO within three years38 
prior to the beginning of the misstated time period, and 0 otherwise;  
 
Sales_Growth = the client’s total sales less the client’s prior year total sales divided 
by the client’s prior year total sales39; 
 
 
                                                 
37 Raw returns yield directly comparable results. 
38 Consistent with Palmrose and Scholz (2004), I choose a three year time period because this represents the 
statute of limitations for auditor legal liability under the Securities Act of 1933. 
39 I winsorize Sales_Growth to the one and 99 percentiles to reduce the influence of outliers. 
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Lit_Ind = an indicator set to 1 if the client operates in an industry with a high 
incidence of shareholder litigation40, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Receivables_Ratio = the client’s total account receivables divided by the client’s total 
assets; 
 
Inventory_Ratio = the client’s total inventory divided by the client’s total assets; 
 
Client_Age  = the number of years the client has been on Compustat since 1974; 
 
Share_Diffusion = the number of common shares outstanding divided by the number of 
common shareholders; 
 
and 
 
Years = year dummies (i.e., indicators set to 1 if the client’s fiscal year-end 
falls in 2000 - 2007, respectively, and 0 otherwise).                                                                                                           
  
 My main variables of interest are the auditor characteristics of the misstatement: 
Fees, Tenure, BigN, and Sox. I include the magnitude or proportion of engagement fees 
comprised of non-audit service fees (Fees) because prior research suggests that the 
perception of auditor independence may be affected by the amount of non-audit services 
provided by an engaged auditor (Hay et al. 2006).41 I include Tenure to assess whether the 
positive relationship between auditor tenure and perceived audit quality (Ghosh and Moon 
2005) influences auditor culpability for past misstatements. Consistent with Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004), I include a Big N (BigN) indicator variable because Palmrose (1988) finds 
that Big N auditors have a lower rate of litigation than non-Big N auditors. I also investigate 
whether the amount of responsibility assigned to an auditor for a past misstatement varies 
following the Sarbanes Oxley Act (Sox).  
                                                 
40 Consistent with Francis et al. (1994), I identify the biotechnology industry (SIC codes 2833-2836, 8731-
8734), computer industry (SIC codes 3570-3577, 7370-7374), electronic industry (SIC codes 3600-3674), and 
retailing industry (SIC codes 5200-5961) as an industry with a high incidence of shareholder litigation. 
41 As a sensitivity test, I examine the ratio of non-audit fees to total engagement fees.  Results are robust to this 
specification. 
30 
 
 
 
I examine the following characteristics specific to the misstatement that could be 
associated with the likelihood that the misstatement results in auditor litigation: Revenue, 
Num_Issues, Fraud, Misstate_Length, Price_Change, Reg_Invest, and Time_Lapse. These 
variables account for the severity of the misstatement and are similar to those included in 
Palmrose and Scholz (2004). I examine misstatements that consist of revenue recognition 
issues (Revenue) and those that disclose fraud or irregularities (Fraud) because Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004) find that core restatements (i.e., those associated with earnings from primary 
operations) and those with fraud or irregularities are more likely to result in auditor 
litigation.42 I examine the number of GAAP and/or FASB accounting failures included in the 
misstatement (Num_Issues), the length of time affected by the misstatement (Time_Length), 
and the security price change surrounding the restatement announcement (Price_Change) 
because Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find these characteristics to be positively associated 
with the likelihood of auditor litigation. I investigate whether the presence of a SEC, 
PCAOB, or other regulatory investigation (Reg_Invest) of the misstating client affects auditor 
culpability because I expect that a regulatory investigation may be indicative of a more 
severe misstatement. Lastly, I examine the effect of the time lag between the misstatement 
period ending date and the subsequent restatement disclosure date (Time_Lapse) on auditor 
culpability because I expect the plaintiff’s burden of proof to be potentially greater as more 
time has passed since the misstatement. A greater burden of proof may decrease the 
likelihood of a successful outcome for a plaintiff and thus, reduce a plaintiff’s propensity to 
include the auditor as a defendant in litigation. However, Sharp (2007) finds that companies 
delay the announcement of large income-decreasing restatements longer than the 
                                                 
42 I examine revenue recognition misstatements rather than core misstatements because Palmrose and Scholz 
(2004) find that revenue recognition misstatements drive their results for the core/noncore test variable. 
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announcements of other restatements. This suggests that a greater time lapse may be 
indicative of a more severe misstatement. In addition, prior literature finds that managers of 
companies involved in litigation pay greater settlement amounts when the disclosure of 
negative earnings news is delayed (Billings 2008). Thus, a greater delay in the disclosure of a 
restatement could increase auditor culpability. As a result, I do not make a directional 
hypothesis on Time_Lapse. 
I also examine the following client characteristics that could be associated with the 
likelihood that the misstatement results in auditor litigation: Client_Size, Bankrupt_Delist, 
Merger, IPO, Sales_Growth, Lit_Ind, Receivables_Ratio, Inventory_Ratio, Client_Age, and 
Share_Diffusion. I include client size (Client_Size) because misstatements of larger clients 
may result in greater shareholder losses and a potential for greater settlements. Therefore, the 
likelihood that misstatements result in auditor litigation may be greater for these clients. I 
investigate whether the occurrence of a bankruptcy or delisting shortly following the issuance 
of the misstated financial statements (Bankrupt_Delist) affects auditor culpability because 
these events may result in greater shareholder losses and a greater likelihood of auditor 
litigation. In addition, Ball (2008) suggests that auditors are often named as defendants when 
the capacity of other defendants to pay is limited. Consistent with Palmrose and Scholz 
(2004), I control for clients that completed an initial public offering (IPO) in close proximity 
to the misstatement because Billings and Lewis (2008) find that aggressive financial 
reporting and trading behavior around an IPO results in an increased incidence of litigation. 
In addition, auditor legal liability is greater for financial statements included in registration 
statements under the Securities Act of 1933.43  
                                                 
43 Auditors are liable for any level of negligence under the Securities Act of 1933 whereas auditors are only 
liable for scienter or gross negligence under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
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I also control for clients that engage in a merger (Merger) in close proximity to the 
misstatement because St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) finds this variable to be positively 
associated with auditor litigation. I include sales growth (Sales_Growth), the ratio of 
accounts receivables to total assets (Receivables_Ratio), and the ratio of inventory to total 
assets (Inventory_Ratio) because Stice (1991) find these characteristics to be positively 
associated with auditor litigation. Consistent with Cahan and Zhang (2006), I control for 
industries with a high incidence of shareholder litigation (Lit_Ind) because these industries 
may offer plaintiffs a higher probability of a successful outcome. I include client age 
(Client_Age) and the diffusion of common share ownership (Share_Diffusion) because these 
characteristics are likely to be associated with the probability that shareholders pursue 
litigation. Lastly, because the severity of restatements has decreased from 1997 to 2007, I 
include year indicator variables (Years) to control for time effects.  
According to Ball (2008), the public reaction to the accounting scandals of 2001 and 
2002 was to assign partial blame to the auditors. He suggests that the scandals induced the 
public to perceive non-audit services as a conflict of auditor interest and a likely impairment 
of auditor judgment (Ball 2008). While prior research provides evidence that non-audit 
services do not impair auditor judgment (Ball 2008), regulators responded to the adverse 
public reaction by banning a significant number of non-audit services that could be provided 
to an audit client by an engaged auditor (SOX 2002).44  As a result, I expect that the 
perception of auditor independence may be more influenced by the amount of non-audit 
services provided to a client in the post-SOX era. Thus, I re-estimate Model (1) and include 
                                                 
44 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 prohibits audit firms from providing any of the following services to a 
publicly traded audit client: (1) bookkeeping and related services; (2) design or implementation of financial 
information systems; (3) appraisal or valuation services; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit outsourcing; (6) 
management or human resources services; (7) investment or broker/dealer services; (8) legal and expert services 
(SOX 2002). 
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an interaction of Fees and Sox. Specifically, I estimate the following logistic regression 
model to investigate the effect of SOX on the relationship between non-audit service fees and 
the likelihood of auditor litigation related to financial statement misstatements:  
Litig = β0 + β1 Fees + β2 Sox + β4 Fees*Sox + β5Tenure + β6 BigN + β7 Revenue +      (2)      
β8 Num_Issues + β9 Fraud + β10 Misstate_Length + β11 Price_Change +  
β12 Reg_Invest + β13 Time_Lapse + β14 Client_Size + β15 Bankrupt_Delist +  
β16 Merger + β17 IPO + β18 Sales_Growth + β19 Lit_Ind + β20 Receivables_Ratio 
+ β21 Inventory_Ratio + β22 Client_Age + β23 Share_Diffusion + β24-29 ∑i=17 Years 
+ ε                  
 
where: 
Fees*Sox = the interaction of Fees (Lfees or Fee_Ratio) and Sox; 
and all other variables are defined above. 
 In this analysis, my main variable of interest is the interaction variable (Fees*Sox). I 
investigate whether the association between non-audit service fees and auditor misstatement-
based litigation varies in the post-Sox time period. A positive coefficient on the Fees*Sox 
interaction variable would indicate that the provision of non-audit services fees to an audit 
client has a stronger effect on the likelihood of auditor misstatement-based litigation in the 
post-SOX era. Thus, this would suggest that SOX may have increased the perception that 
non-audit service fees reduce audit quality.  
Misstatement-based Litigation Resulting in Auditor Settlements 
 My third empirical model investigates the occurrence of an auditor settlement related 
to auditor misstatement-based litigation. I investigate the likelihood of an auditor settlement 
resulting from misstatement-based litigation because the occurrence of an auditor settlement 
related to misstatement-based litigation represents an observable cost to an auditor. While a 
financial statement misstatement indicates that an audit failure has occurred, the amount of 
responsibility assigned to an auditor for this failure may vary across misstatements. Because 
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not all auditor litigation is meritorious (Palmrose 1997), there are instances where an auditor 
who is cited as a defendant in a lawsuit is subsequently dismissed. The occurrence of an 
auditor settlement suggests that the auditor lawsuit contained at least some merit. Otherwise, 
the auditor would have forced the lawsuit to go to trial knowing that the plaintiffs’ claims 
were unsupportable. However, advocates for auditor legal liability reform argue that audit 
firms are often forced to settle lawsuits regardless of the merit of the plaintiffs’ claims 
because the size of the claims are so large that the risk of an unsuccessful resolution 
outweigh the cost of a settlement (Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 2008). 
Thus, I use a multivariate logistic regression model to investigate whether it is the size of the 
plaintiffs’ claims or the characteristics of the misstatement (e.g., misstatement severity, 
auditor characteristics, and/or client characteristics) that drive auditor settlements related to 
misstatement-based litigation. Specifically, I limit my sample of misstatements to those that 
result in auditor litigation and I estimate the following logistic regression model: 
Settle =  β0 + β1 Acct_Inflate + β2 Stock_Inflate + β3 Fees + β4 Tenure + β5 BigN + β6 Sox +  
  β7 Revenue + β8 Num_Issues + β9 Fraud + β10 Misstate_Length + β11 Reg_Invest +  
  β12 Time_Lapse + β13 Client_Size + β14 Merger + β15 IPO + β16 Lit_Ind +  
  β17 Client_Age + β18 Share_Diffusion + ε       (3)    
                       
where: 
 
Settle = an indicator set to 1 if the lawsuit results in an auditor settlement, and 0 
otherwise; 
 
Acct_Inflate = the amount of the plaintiffs’ alleged inflation in net income or equity as 
disclosed in the court documents; 
 
Stock_Inflate = the plaintiffs’ alleged percentage decrease in share price during the class 
action period as disclosed in the court documents;  
 
and all other variables are as defined above. 
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While I am interested in the coefficients on all variables, my main variables of 
interest are Acct_Inflate and Stock_Inflate. Acct_Inflate represents the amount of the 
plaintiffs’ alleged manipulation in the financial statements whereas Stock_Inflate represents 
the amount of the plaintiff’s alleged stock inflation that occurs from the financial statement 
misstatement. Because an auditor often chooses to settle out of court with the intent to avoid 
potential future litigation costs, I expect that the size of the plaintiffs’ claims will provide an 
incremental effect on the likelihood that an auditor defendant pays a settlement in a lawsuit 
resulting from a misstatement. As a result, I expect a positive and significant coefficient on 
Acct_Inflate and Stock_Inflate. To my knowledge, this is the first study that uses a 
multivariate model to examine the association between the size of the plaintiffs’ claims, the 
severity of the misstatement, auditor characteristics, and client characteristics and the 
likelihood that an auditor defendant pays a settlement in a lawsuit resulting from a 
misstatement.  
Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior 
The debate about the appropriate level of auditor legal liability is driven by 
conflicting views on the effect of private litigation on audit firms (Advisory Committee on the 
Auditing Profession 2008). Advocates for legal liability reform argue that private litigation 
results in catastrophic risks of loss that include litigation, settlement, and reputational costs. 
They argue that audit firms are unable to adequately insure themselves against these 
unpredictable risks. As a result, these catastrophic risks could threaten the survival of an audit 
firm (Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 2008). Opponents of legal liability 
reform argue that private litigation plays a role in ensuring accountability and confidence in the 
financial markets (Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 2008). They argue that a 
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reduction in auditor legal liability would adversely impact an investor’s perception of audit 
quality and would reduce the intensity of audits (Advisory Committee on the Auditing 
Profession 2008).  Rather that reduce auditor legal liability, they suggest that audit firms can 
protect themselves from catastrophic liability by performing high quality audits (Advisory 
Committee on the Auditing Profession 2008).  I examine the effect of litigation on audit firms 
by examining the behavior of auditors following litigation. Because prior analytical research 
suggests that additional legal exposure can induce auditors to either report more conservatively 
or to increase effort (Thoman 1996), I empirically examine both of these possible behavior 
changes. First, I examine the effect of litigation on an auditor’s decision to require more 
conservative client-reported accruals (i.e., to report more conservatively). Second, I examine 
the effect of litigation on an auditor’s decision to increase the amount of time spent to complete 
an audit (i.e., to increase audit effort).    
Auditor conservatism has been defined as an “auditor’s preference for income-
decreasing accounting choices” (Kim et al. 2003, 327). Because accrual-based earnings involve 
estimates about future events and these estimates are jointly determined by a client and its 
auditor, I use client-specific discretionary accruals as my first measure of changes in auditor 
behavior. I predict that litigation will result in increased auditor conservatism and that this 
conservatism will be evidenced by an increase in an auditor’s preference for income-
decreasing discretionary accruals across an office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the 
litigated client). I estimate the client-specific discretionary component of total accruals using a 
performance-adjusted modified Jones model. Following Kothari et al. (2005), the model is 
estimated by year and 2-digit SIC industry for all observations available in Compustat:45  
                                                 
45 I eliminate industry-year combinations that have fewer than ten firm-year observations.  I trim all inputs to the one 
and 99 percentiles to reduce the influence of outliers. 
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Total_AC/TAt-1 = β0 + β1 1/ TAt-1 + β2 (ΔSalest - ΔARt)/TAt-1 + β3 PPEt/TAt-1+ β4 ROA + ε  
(4) where: 
Total_AC  = total accruals (Income before extraordinary items – adjusted 
operating cashflows) (Cahan and Zhang 2006); 
 
TA  = total assets; 
 
Sales  = total sales; 
 
AR  = accounts receivable; 
 
PPE  = property, plant, and equipment; 
 
ROA  = net income divided by total assets; 
 
and 
 
ε  = total discretionary accruals (DAC). 
 
My empirical tests use both the signed (Sign_DAC or Pos_DAC) discretionary 
accruals and the absolute value (Abs_DAC) of total discretionary accruals (DAC). I examine 
the signed discretionary accruals because I expect auditors engaged in conservative behavior 
may have a preference for income-decreasing accruals rather than income-increasing accruals. 
I examine absolute value of discretionary accruals because this measure should capture the 
magnitude of financial reporting decisions regardless of the directional effect of those 
decisions (Klein 2002). Specifically, I estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression model: 
Accr = β0 + β1 Lit + β2 Post + β3 Lit*Post + β4 BigN + β5 Client_Size + β6 OCF +  (5) 
β7 Abs_TAC + β8 Lev + β9 Client_Age + β10 Tenure + β11 Prior_AA +  
β12 Pr_Bank + β13 Chg_NI + β14 New_Fin + β15 Loss + β16 Growth +  
β 17-31 ∑i=1
1-15
 Industry + ε    
              
where: 
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Accr = the absolute value (Abs_DAC) or signed (Sign_DAC or Pos_DAC)46 client-
specific estimate of discretionary accruals using a performance-adjusted 
modified Jones model47; 
 
Lit = an indicator variable set to 1 if the financial statements were audited by a 
litigated auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Post = an indicator variable set to 1 if the financial statements were issued 
following litigation48, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Lit*Post = an interaction of Lit and Post; 
 
Accruals Control Variables: 
 
BigN  = an indicator set to 1 if the engaged auditor was a Big N auditor, and 
0 otherwise; 
 
Client_Size = the natural logarithm of the client’s total assets; 
 
OCF = the client’s cash flows from operations scaled by the client’s prior 
year total assets; 
 
Abs_TAC = the absolute value of the client’s total accruals scaled by the client’s 
prior year total assets; 
 
Lev = the client’s ratio of total debt to total assets; 
 
Client_Age = the total number of years for which total assets was reported for the 
client in COMPUSTAT since 1974; 
 
Tenure = the total number of consecutive years that the client has retained 
their current auditor as of the financial statement date; 
 
Litigation Risk Control Variables: 
 
Prior_AA = an indicator set to 1 if the client’s engaged auditor was Arthur 
Andersen during 2001 or 2002, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Pr_Bank = the Hopwood et al. (1994) probability of bankruptcy score; 
 
                                                 
46 For the absolute value or positive discretionary accrual analysis, I use a truncated tobit regression which 
employs a lower bound of zero for the discretionary accrual values. Utilizing an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
approach would lead to estimates biased toward zero (Greene 2003). 
47 See Model 3 for a description of the performance-adjusted modified Jones model.  I trim Accr to the one and 99 
percentiles to reduce the influence of outliers. 
48 I identify the litigation date as the date the wrongdoing becomes public knowledge as disclosed in the Audit 
Analytics database. 
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Chg_NI = the client’s net income less the client’s prior year net income divided 
by the client’s prior year net income;  
 
New_Fin = an indicator set to 1 if the client issued new shares equal to or 
greater than 10 percent of the shares outstanding at the beginning of 
the year, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Loss = an indicator set to 1 if the client reported a loss, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Growth = the client’s market value of common equity divided by the client’s 
book value of common equity at the beginning of the year;  
 
 
and 
 
Industry  = industry dummies (i.e., indicators set to 1 for each of fifteen 2-digit 
SIC industries, and 0 otherwise). 
 
My main variables of interest are Lit, Post, and Lit*Post. The coefficient on Lit 
estimates the difference in discretionary accruals between clients of litigated and non-litigated 
auditors prior to litigation. The coefficient on Post estimates the change in discretionary 
accruals following litigation for clients of non-litigated auditors. The coefficient on Lit*Post 
estimates the difference in the constraint of absolute value and signed discretionary accruals 
post-litigation for litigated auditors versus non-litigated auditors. A negative coefficient on 
Lit*Post would would support my third hypothesis and would indicate a greater constraint of 
absolute value and signed discretionary accruals post-litigation for litigated auditors versus 
non-litigated auditors. In addition, a negative coefficient on the joint test for Post + Lit*Post 
would indicate a decrease in absolute value and signed discretionary accruals following 
litigation for litigated auditors. A negative coefficient on the joint test for Lit + Lit*Post would 
indicate that following litigation the total magnitude of absolute value and signed discretionary 
accruals is smaller for litigated versus non-litigated auditors. 
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I include numerous control variables from the prior literature. First, I include 
variables that prior literature finds to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. 
Specifically, I include a Big N (BigN) indicator because Becker et al. (1998) find that clients of 
Big 6 auditors report lower absolute value discretionary accruals than clients of non-Big 6 
auditors. I control for client size (Client_Size) because accrual activity is expected to vary with 
client size (Dechow and Dichev 2002). I include cash flows from operations (OCF) because 
prior literature finds a negative association between discretionary accruals and cash flows 
(Dechow 1994; Sloan 1996). I control for the client’s accrual generating potential with the 
absolute value of total accruals (Abs_TAC) (Becker et al. 1998), and I include leverage (Lev) 
because DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find a positive association between debt covenant 
violations and discretionary accruals. I include Client_Age because Anthony and Ramesh 
(1992) find that accounting performance measures vary with changes in a client’s life cycle. 
Lastly, I control for Tenure because Myers et al. (2003) find that clients having longer 
relationships with their auditors report discretionary accruals that are smaller in magnitude. 
Because I aim to isolate the effect of actual litigation on auditor behavior from the 
effect of other litigation risks on auditor behavior, I include numerous variables that prior work 
indicates are associated with increased auditor litigation risk. Specifically, I include an 
indicator for prior Arthur Andersen clients (Prior_AA) because Cahan and Zhang (2006) find 
that successor auditors of Arthur Andersen clients required more conservative accounting from 
these clients. Similar to Cahan and Zhang (2006), I include several variables that capture the 
expected net benefits associated with litigation. I include a bankruptcy probability score 
(Pr_Bank) because Stice (1991) finds that a client’s financial condition is negatively related to 
the likelihood of a lawsuit. I control for client size (Client_Size) because Stice (1991) and Lys 
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and Watts (1994) show that auditors of large clients are more likely to be sued. I include 
several variables to capture the client’s incentive to manage earnings because prior literature 
indicates that auditor conservatism will be most evident when an auditor and its client have 
conflicting incentives (Kim et al. 2003; Anderson et al. 2004). Consistent with Lee and Mande 
(2003), I include the percentage change in the client’s net income from the prior year to the 
current year (Chg_NI) because managers may have an incentive to manage earnings to obtain 
compensation bonuses. Consistent with Cahan and Zhang (2006), I control for the issuance of 
new equity (New_Fin) because prior literature finds that managers have incentive to increase 
earnings prior to equity offers (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998). Consistent with Lee and 
Mande (2003), I include an indicator for clients experiencing losses (Loss) because prior 
literature suggests that discretionary accruals reported by these clients may reflect contractual 
renegotiations associated with financial difficulty (DeAngelo et al. 1994) or that managers of 
these clients may use discretionary accruals opportunistically (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). I 
control for growth clients (Growth) with the market-to-book ratio because managers of these 
clients tend to have more accounting discretion (Smith and Watts 1992) and have a greater 
incentive to meet earnings forecasts (Skinner and Sloan 2002). Lastly, I include an indicator 
for each 2-digit SIC industry (Industry) because accruals (Barth et al. 2001) and litigation risk 
(Francis et. al 1994) vary by industry. 
While litigation might induce an auditor to report more conservatively, it may also 
induce an auditor to act more conservatively by increasing auditor effort (Thoman 1996). In 
order to examine the effect of litigation on auditor effort, I examine an auditor’s decision to 
increase the amount of time spent to complete an audit. I use the audit report lag, defined as the 
number of days between the client’s fiscal year-end and the client’s audit report date, as my 
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proxy for auditor effort. Specifically, I estimate the following negative binomial regression 
model: 
Arl = β0 + β1 Lit + β2 Post + β3 Lit*Post + β4 BigN + β5 Client_Size + β6 Lag_Arl +    (6)       
β7 Busy + β8 Restate + β9 Qualified + β10 EI + β11 ROA + β12 Prior_AA +  
β13 Pr_Bank + β14 Chg_NI + β15 New_Fin + β16 Loss +β17 Growth +  
β 18-32 ∑i=1
1-15
 Industry + ε    
                  
where: 
 
Arl = the number of days between the client’s fiscal year-end and the client’s 
audit report date; 
 
Lag_Arl = the number of days between the client’s prior fiscal year-end and the 
client’s prior audit report date; 
 
Busy = an indicator set to 1 if the client’s fiscal year ends in December, and 0 
otherwise; 
 
Restate = an indicator set to 1 if financial statements for any prior period were 
restated in the current period, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Qualified = an indicator set to 1 if the audit opinion is qualified49, and 0 otherwise; 
 
EI = an indicator set to 1 if the financial statements include at least one 
extraordinary item, and 0 otherwise; 
 
ROA = net income divided by total assets; 
 
and all other variables are as defined above. 
 
While an ordinary lease squares (OLS) regression model is more common in the prior 
literature (e.g., Bamber et al. 1993, Simnett et al. 1995, Schwartz and Soo 1996, etc.) a 
negative binomial regression model is more appropriate for ARL data. The negative binomial 
regression model is a count model (i.e., the dependent variable is a count variable that takes the 
value of any integer between zero and infinity) that corrects for overdispersion (i.e., when the 
sample variance is greater than the sample mean). Because the ARL is a count of the number 
                                                 
49 I identify qualified opinions as all adverse, qualified, and going concern audit opinions available in the 
Compustat and/or Audit Analytics databases.  
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of days between a client’s fiscal year-end and the report date and because the variance within 
my sample is greater than the mean, this model is most appropriate (Long and Freese 2006).50 
Consistent with the accruals analysis, my main variables of interest are Lit, Post, and Lit*Post. 
I also include numerous control variables from the prior literature. First, to control for 
differences in the efficiency of Big N versus non-Big N audits (Leventis et al. 2005), I include 
a Big N (BigN) indicator variable. I include client size (Client_Size) because larger clients 
typically have shorter ARLs (Ashton et al. 1989; Bamber et al. 1993; Cullinan 2003). I control 
for the prior year audit report lag (Lag_Arl) because Simnett et al. (1995) find that report lags 
often do not vary significantly from year to year. Because busy season audits are associated 
with longer delays (Johnson et al. 2002), I include an indicator for December fiscal year-ends 
(Busy). I control for current restatements of prior period financial statements (Restate), 
qualified audit opinions (Qualified), and the existence of extraordinary items (EI) because prior 
literature finds that these characteristics are associated with longer audit delays (e.g., Whittred 
1980; Bamber et al. 1993; Kinney and McDaniel 1993). Because prior literature finds that a 
deteriorating financial condition is positively associated with the ARL (Jaggi and Tsui 1999), I 
include return on assets (ROA) to control for client financial condition. Lastly, I include 
numerous litigation risk control variables (i.e., Prior_AA, Pr_Bank, Chg_NI, New_Fin, Loss, 
Growth, Industry) because the presence of these characteristics may increase audit risk, 
increase audit effort, and therefore, result in longer audit delays. In sum, I examine the 
occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to financial statement misstatements and 
the effect of auditor litigation on subsequent auditor behavior. My aim is to better understand 
the role of litigation on the auditing profession. Table 3 provides a summary of all variables 
used in my empirical models. 
                                                 
50 Results are robust when the analysis is performed with the traditional OLS model. 
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TABLE 3 
Variable Definitions 
 
Panel A: Variables Used in the Analysis of Auditor Litigation Resulting from Misstatements (variables used in Model 1): 
     
Variable Name Variable Type Expectation Definition Reference 
Acct_Inflate Test + = the amount of the plaintiffs’ alleged inflation in net income or equity as disclosed in the court documents. NA 
Bankrupt_Delist Control + 
= an indicator set to 1 if the client went bankrupt or delisted from the stock 
exchange within 365 days of the issuance of the misstated financial 
statements, and 0 otherwise. 
Ball (2008); 
Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004) 
BigN Test ? = an indicator set to 1 if the auditor engaged during the misstatement was a Big N auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
Palmrose 
(1988); 
Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004) 
Client_Age Control - = the number of years the client has been on Compustat since 1974.  
Client_Size Control + = the natural logarithm of the client’s total assets. Palmrose and Scholz (2004) 
Fee_Ratio Test + = the  ratio of non-audit fees charged to the client in the misstated fiscal year. 
Hay et al. 
(2006) 
Fees*Sox Test + = the interaction of Fees (LFees or Fee_Ratio) and Sox. NA 
Fraud Control + = an indicator set to 1 if the misstatement includes fraud, irregularities, or misrepresentations, and 0 otherwise. 
Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004) 
Inventory_Ratio Control + = the client’s total inventory divided by the client’s total assets. Stice (1991) 
IPO Control + = an indicator set to 1 if the client issued an IPO within three years prior to the beginning of the misstated time period, and 0 otherwise. 
Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004); 
Billings and 
Lewis (2008) 
LFees Test + = the natural logarithm of the total non-audit fees charged to the client in the misstated fiscal year. 
Hay et al. 
(2006) 
Litig Dependent NA = an indicator set to 1 if the misstatement results in auditor litigation in any subsequent year, and 0 otherwise. NA 
Merger Control + = an indicator set to 1 if the client went through a merger in the year prior to the misstatement, and 0 otherwise. 
St. Pierre and 
Anderson 
(1994) 
Misstate_Length Control ? = the number of days between the misstatement period beginning and ending date. 
Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004) 
Num_Issues Control + = the number of accounting rule (i.e., FASB/GAAP) application failures identified in the misstatement. 
Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004) 
 
 
  
TABLE 3 Continued 
 
Variable Name Variable Type Expectation Definition Reference 
Price_Change Control - = the three-day market-adjusted return around the misstatement disclosure date based on a value-weighted market index. 
Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004) 
Receivables_Ratio Control + = the client’s total account receivables divided by the client’s total assets. Stice (1991) 
Reg_Invest Control + = an indicator set to 1 if the SEC, PCAOB, or another regulatory body is investigating the registrant, and 0 otherwise. 
Because I 
expect that a 
regulatory 
investigation 
may be 
indicative of a 
more severe 
restatement 
Revenue Control + = an indicator set to 1 if the misstatement includes a revenue recognition issue, and 0 otherwise. 
Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004) 
Lit_Ind Control + 
= an indicator set to 1 if the client operates in an industry with a high 
incidence of shareholder litigation (SIC codes 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 3570-
3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, and 5200-5961), and 0 otherwise 
Francis et al. 
(1994); Cahan 
and Zhang 
(2006) 
Sales_Growth Control ? = the client’s total sales less the client’s prior year total sales divided by the 
client’s prior year total sales. Stice (1991) 
Share_Diffusion Control - = the number of common shares outstanding divided by the number of common shareholders. 
To control for 
the probability 
that 
shareholders 
pursue 
litigation. 
Sox Test ? = an indicator set to 1 if the restatement is disclosed after July 31, 2002, and 0 otherwise. 
To examine 
differences 
following 
SOX. 
Stock_Inflate Test + = the plaintiffs’ alleged percentage decrease in share price during the class action period as disclosed in the court documents. NA 
Tenure Test - = the number of consecutive years the client had retained their current auditor as of the misstatement date. 
Ghosh and 
Moon (2005) 
Time_Lapse Control ? = the number of days between the restatement disclosure date and the misstatement period ending date. 
Sharp (2007); 
Billings (2008)  45 
 
 
  
TABLE 3 Continued 
 
Variable Name Variable Type Expectation Definition Reference 
Years Control ? = year dummies (i.e., indicators set to 1 if the client’s fiscal year-end falls in 2000 - 2007, respectively, and 0 otherwise). 
To control for 
time effects. 
 
Panel B: Variables Used in the Performance-Adjusted Modified Jones Accruals Model (variables used in Model 2): 
Variable Name Definition 
AR = accounts receivable (Compustat item #2). 
PPE = property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item #7). 
ROA = net income (Compustat item #18) / total assets (Compustat item #6). 
Sales = total sales (Compustat item #12). 
TA = total assets (Compustat item #6). 
Total_AC 
= total accruals [Income before extraordinary items [(Compustat item #123) – adjusted operating cashflows (Compustat item 
#308 - #124)] (Cahan and Zhang 2006). 
ε = total discretionary accruals (DAC). 
 
Panel C: Variables Used in the Analysis of the Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior  
(variables used in Model 3 and Model 4): 
Variable Name Variable Type Expectation  Definition Reference 
Abs_TAC Dependent NA = the absolute value of the client’s total accruals scaled by the client’s prior year total assets. 
Becker et al. 
(1998) 
Accr Dependent NA 
= the absolute value (DAC) or signed (Sign_DAC or Pos_DAC) client-
specific estimate of discretionary accruals using a performance-adjusted 
modified Jones model. 
NA 
Arl Dependent NA = the number of days between the client’s fiscal year-end and the client’s audit report date. Bamber (1993) 
BigN Control - = an indicator set to 1 if the engaged auditor was a Big N auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
Becker et al. 
(1998); 
Leventis et al. 
(2005); Kim et 
al. (2002) 
Busy Control + = an indicator set to 1 if the client’s fiscal year ends in December, and 0 otherwise. 
Johnson et al. 
(2002) 
Chg_NI Control ? = the client’s net income less the client’s prior year net income divided by 
the client’s prior year net income. 
Lee and 
Mande (2003) 
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TABLE 3 Continued 
Variable Name Variable Type Expectation  Definition Reference 
Client_Age Control ? = the total number of years for which total assets was reported for the client in COMPUSTAT since 1974. 
Anthony and 
Ramesh 
(1992) 
Client_Size Control ? = the natural logarithm of the client’s total assets. 
Ashton et al. 
(1989); 
Bamber et al. 
(1993); 
Cullinan 
(2003); Stice 
(1991); Lys 
and Watts 
(1994); 
Reynolds and 
Francis 
(2001); 
Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) 
EI Control + = an indicator set to 1 if the financial statements include at least one extraordinary item, and 0 otherwise. 
Whittred 
(1980); 
Bamber et al. 
(1993); 
Kinney and 
McDaniel 
(1993) 
Growth Control ? = the client’s market value of equity divided by the client’s book value of common equity at the beginning of the year. 
Smith and 
Watts (1992); 
Skinner and 
Sloan (2002) 
Industry Control NA = indicators set to 1 for each of eleven 2-digit SIC industries, and 0 otherwise. 
Francis et al. 
(1994); Barth 
et al. (2001) 
Lag_Arl Control + = the number of days between the client’s prior fiscal year-end and the 
client’s prior audit report date. 
Simnett et al. 
(1995) 
Lev Control + = the client’s ratio of total debt to total assets. 
DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 
(1994) 
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TABLE 3 Continued 
Variable Name Variable Type Expectation  Definition Reference 
Lit Test ? = an indicator variable set to 1 if the financial statements were audited by a litigated auditor, and 0 otherwise. NA 
Lit*Post Test +/- = an interaction of Lit and Post. NA 
Loss Control ? = an indicator set to 1 if the client reported a loss, and 0 otherwise. 
DeAngelo et 
al. (1994); 
Burgstahler 
and Dichev 
(1997); Lee 
and Mande 
(2003) 
New_Fin Control ? 
= an indicator set to 1 if the client issued new shares equal to or greater than 
10 percent of the shares outstanding at the beginning of the year, and 0 
otherwise. 
Rangan 
(1998); Teoh 
et al. (1998); 
Cahan and 
Zhang (2006) 
OCF Control - = the client’s cash flows from operations scaled by the client’s prior year total assets. 
Dechow 
(1994); Sloan 
(1996) 
Post Test +/- = an indicator variable set to 1 if the financial statements were issued following litigation1, and 0 otherwise. NA 
Pr_Bank Control ? = the Hopwood et al. (1994) probability of bankruptcy score. 
Stice (1991); 
Cahan and 
Zhan (2006) 
Prior_AA Control - = an indicator set to 1 if the client’s engaged auditor was Arthur Andersen during 2001 or 2002, and 0 otherwise. 
Cahan and 
Zhang (2006) 
Qualified Control + = an indicator set to 1 if the audit opinion is qualified, and 0 otherwise. 
Whittred 
(1980); 
Bamber et al. 
(1993); 
Kinney and 
McDaniel 
(1993) 
                                                 
1 I identify the litigation date as the date the wrongdoing becomes public knowledge as disclosed in the Audit Analytics database. 
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TABLE 3 Continued 
Variable Name Variable Type Expectation  Definition  
Restate Control + = an indicator set to 1 if financial statements for any prior period were restated in the current period, and 0 otherwise. 
Whittred 
(1980); 
Bamber et al. 
(1993); 
Kinney and 
McDaniel 
(1993) 
ROA Control - = net income divided by total assets. Jaggi and Tsui (1999) 
Tenure Control - = the total number of consecutive years that the client has retained their current auditor as of the financial statement date. 
Myers et al. 
(2003) 
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics: Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Auditor 
Litigation 
 Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for my full sample of financial statement 
misstatements. With respect to my auditor characteristics, the univariate mean and median 
tests presented in Table 4 indicate that a misstatement is more likely to result in auditor 
litigation when the misstatement is associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater 
magnitude (LFees) and/or proportion of non-audit services (Fee_Ratio). The distribution of 
non-audit fees (Non-Audit_Fees) and total assets audited (Client_Size) is right-skewed, so I 
use the natural logarithm of this value to control for non-audit fees in my multivariate 
empirical tests. I do not find any significant relationship between auditor tenure and the 
likelihood of auditor misstatement-based litigation. My univariate chi-square tests also 
suggest that misstatement-based litigation may be more likely for Big N (Big N) auditors and 
less likely in the post-SOX time period.  
The univariate tests in Table 4 also indicate that a misstatement is more likely to 
result in litigation when the misstatement is more severe. Specifically, auditor misstatement-
based litigation is more likely when the misstatement is associated with more accounting 
application (i.e., FASB/GAAP) failures (Num_Issues), especially when the failure involved 
revenue recognition (Revenue), a longer misstated time period (Misstate_Length), a greater 
stock price decline at the misstatement disclosure date (Price_Change), and a higher 
incidence of fraud (Fraud) and/or a regulatory investigation (Reg_Invest). In addition, I find 
50 
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that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely when the time between the 
misstatement and the disclosure of the misstatement is shorter (Time_Lapse). 
With respect to client characteristics, the univariate tests in Table 4 indicate that a 
misstatement is more likely to result in litigation when the misstatement is issued by a larger 
client (Client_Size). The distribution of total assets audited is right-skewed so I use the 
natural logarithm of this value to control for client size in my multivariate empirical tests. I 
also find that misstatements issued by riskier clients are more likely to result in litigation. 
Specifically, I find that clients with auditor misstatement-based litigation have greater sales 
growth (Sales_Growth), a higher ratio of accounts receivable to total assets 
(Receivables_Ratio), and operate in a high litigation risk industry (Rsky). However, my 
univariate tests do not indicate that clients with auditor misstatement-based litigation have a 
higher ratio of inventory to total assets or a greater concentration of common share 
ownership.  
52 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics:  
 
Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Auditor Litigation 
N = 1,673 misstatements 
 
 
*, **, *** indicate that mean/median tests are significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  All variables are 
defined in Table 1.  
                                                 
4 Non-audit fees reported in dollars (not in logged value for ease of interpretation). 
5 Total assets reported in millions of dollars (not in logged value for ease of interpretation). 
  Resulting in Litigation 
N = 65 
 Not Resulting in Litigation 
N = 1,608 
Continuous Variables  Mean  Median  Mean    Median 
Non-Audit_Fees
4
  5,153,122***  836,000**  860,964  186,668 
Fee_Ratio  48 percent***    46 percent*** 30 percent  27 percent 
Tenure  4.6 years  4 years  4.7 years  5 years 
Num_Issues  3.4**  2  2.7  2 
Misstate_Length  1,105 days*  1,003 days  997 days  730 days 
Price_Change  -8 percent**  -3 percent**  -0.1   -0.9 percent 
Time_Lapse 
Client_Size
5
  
Sales_Growth 
Receivables_Ratio 
Inventory_Ratio 
Client_Age 
Share_ Diffusion 
 
Discrete Variables 
 197 days* 
59,674*** 
29 percent 
20 percent** 
5 percent*** 
13 years* 
84 shares 
 145 days 
2,013*** 
12 percent 
14 percent* 
1 percent** 
11 years 
26 shares 
 223 days 
4,873 
21 percent 
16 percent 
11 percent 
14 years 
98 shares 
 159 days 
401 
9 percent 
11 percent 
5 percent 
13 years 
19 shares 
  Frequency  Percent Frequency Percent 
BigN  59*  91 1,373 85 
Sox  54***  83 1,513 94 
Revenue  23***  35 290 18 
Fraud  7***  11 36 2 
Reg_Invest  24***  37 196 12 
Bankrupt_Delist  5**  8 20 1 
Merger  22***  34 314 20 
IPO  6  9 95 6 
Lit_Ind  17*  26 536 33 
53 
 
 
 
Lastly, my univariate tests indicate that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more 
likely for younger clients (Client_Age), for those who issue a misstatement shortly following 
a merger (Merger), and for those that go bankrupt or delist from the stock exchange shortly 
following the misstatement (Bankrupt_Delist). My univariate tests do not indicate a 
significant association between an initial public offering (IPO) and the likelihood of auditor 
misstatement-based litigation.  
Multivariate Results: Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Auditor 
Litigation 
Table 5 presents the results of model (1), which estimates the likelihood that a 
financial statement misstatement results in auditor litigation. This model is estimated for 
1,673 observations, consisting of 65 misstatements that resulted in auditor litigation and 
1,608 misstatements that did not result in auditor litigation. Among other characteristics, the 
analysis includes an investigation of the impact of the magnitude of non-audit service fees 
(i.e., first two columns) and the proportion of non-audit service fees (i.e., second two 
columns) on the likelihood that a misstatement results in auditor litigation. The area under 
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is 86 percent for both regressions, which 
suggests that the logistic model has excellent discrimination.51  
                                                 
51 The ROC curve is a graphical plot of the sensitivity versus specificity for a binary classification as a 
discrimination threshold is varied.  An area under the ROC curve of 100 (50) percent would be completely 
informative (uninformative).  Hosmer and Lemeshaw (2000) suggests that an area greater than 70 (80) percent 
represents acceptable (excellent) discrimination.   
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TABLE 5 
Logistic Regression: Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Auditor Litigation 
 
Litig = β0 + β1 Fees + β2 Tenure + β3 BigN + β4 Sox + β5 Revenue + β6 Num_Issues + β7 Fraud +  
β8 Misstate_Length + β9 Price_Change + β10 Reg_Invest + β11 Time_Lapse + β12 Client_Size +  
β13 Bankrupt_Delist + β14 Merger + β15 IPO + β16 Sales_Growth + β17 Lit_Ind + β18 
Receivables_Ratio + β19 Inventory_Ratio + β20 Client_Age +  β21 Share_Diffusion +  
β 22-28 ∑i=1
7
 Years +   ε      (1) 
 
*, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Tests are one-tailed when signs are predicted.  All 
variables are defined in Table 1.   
  Analysis Including 
Non-Audit Fee Magnitude 
Analysis Including 
Non-Audit Fee 
Proportion 
  
Variable Sign Coefficient Z-Statistic Coefficient Z-Statistic 
Auditor Characteristics:      
LFees + 0.36 2.68*** - - 
Fee_Ratio + - - 2.15 2.86*** 
Tenure - 0.06 0.64 0.07 0.78 
BigN ? -1.06 -1.90** -1.04 -1.85** 
Sox ? -0.50 -0.72 -0.61 -0.87 
Restatement Characteristics: 
Revenue + 0.52 1.63** 0.57 1.80** 
Num_Issues + 0.09 1.43* 0.09 1.37* 
Fraud + 0.99 1.76** 1.11 1.97** 
Misstate_Length ? 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.51 
Price_Change - -1.84 -2.45*** -1.81 -2.38*** 
Reg_Invest + 0.98 2.83*** 0.98 2.82*** 
Time_Lapse ? -0.00 -0.89 -0.00 0.32 
Client Characteristics:      
Client_Size + 0.22 1.87** 0.40 4.71*** 
Bankrupt_Delist + 2.41 3.96*** 2.54 4.19*** 
Merger + 0.16 0.49 0.27 0.84 
IPO + 0.30 0.55 0.24 0.67 
Sales_Growth ? 0.12 0.50 0.06 0.23 
Lit_Ind + 0.16 0.48 0.22 0.64 
Receivables_Ratio + 1.00 1.26 0.94 1.21 
Inventory_Ratio + -3.59 -2.14 -3.22 -1.98 
Client_Age - -0.06 -2.20*** -0.05 -2.11** 
Share_Diffusion - -0.00 -0.72 -0.00 -0.66 
Intercept N/A -9.82 -5.25*** -6.98 -4.75*** 
Years  Year controls included but not tabulated 
      
N =  1,673 1,673 
Pseudo. R-Square  0.2658 0.2663 
LR Chi-Square Statistic  146.09*** 146.36*** 
Area under ROC curve  0.8603 0.8611 
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Regarding tests of the first hypothesis, I find that misstatements associated with 
engagement fees that consist of a greater magnitude of non-audit fees (LFees) or a greater 
proportion of non-audit fees (Fee_Ratio) are more likely to result in auditor litigation. This 
suggests that the responsibility assigned to auditors for past misstatements might be related to 
the types of services auditors provide to misstating clients. In other words, the greater amount 
and proportion of non-audit services provided to a client by an auditor may affect a third 
party’s perception of auditor independence and may result in additional blame placed upon 
the auditor for the misstatement.  
Regarding the tests of the second hypothesis, I do not find empirical evidence that 
auditor tenure is associated auditor misstatement-based litigation. Specifically, the 
coefficients on auditor tenure (Tenure) are positive and insignificant in both columns of 
Table 5. This suggests that the positive relationship between auditor tenure and perceived 
audit quality documented in the prior literature (Ghosh and Moon 2005) may not be present 
in the misstatement-based litigation setting.52 With respect to my other auditor 
characteristics, and consistent with Palmrose (1988), I find that misstatements disclosed by 
Big N (Big N) auditors are less likely than misstatements disclosed by non-Big N auditors to 
result in auditor litigation. However, the coefficient on Sox does not enter the model 
significantly. This suggests that the likelihood of auditor litigation to result from a financial 
statement misstatement does not vary between the pre and post-Sarbanes Oxley time period. 
Consistent with Palmrose and Scholz (2004), I find that misstatements that include a 
revenue recognition issue (Revenue), misstatements with a greater number of accounting rule 
application (i.e., FASB /GAAP) failures (Num_Issues), misstatements disclosing the 
presence of fraud or irregularities (Fraud), and misstatements that have a greater stock price 
                                                 
52 However, this conclusion is tenuous because it is based on a null finding.   
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decline at the misstatement disclosure date (Price_Change) are more likely to result in 
auditor litigation. I also find that the coefficient on Reg_Invest is positive and significant, 
suggesting that auditor litigation may be more likely when the misstating client is 
experiencing a regulatory investigation. These results suggest that misstatement severity is a 
major determinant of auditor litigation. Similar to Palmrose and Scholz (2004), I find that the 
number of days restated (Misstate_Length) is not significantly associated with auditor 
litigation. I also do not find that a significant relationship exists between auditor litigation 
and the length of time between the misstatement disclosure date and misstatement period-
ending date (Time_Lapse).  
With respect to client characteristics, I find that the coefficient on client size 
(Client_Size) is positive and significant, suggesting that misstatements of larger clients are 
more likely to result in auditor litigation. I also find that misstatements associated with 
clients that went bankrupt or delisted from the stock exchange shortly following the 
misstatement (Bankrupt_Delist) are more likely to result in auditor litigation. These findings 
are similar to Palmrose and Scholz (2004) who find a positive but insignificant association 
between these variables and auditor litigation. In addition, I find that misstatements issued by 
older clients (Client_Age) are less likely to result in auditor litigation. However, I do not find 
the coefficients on any other client characteristic variables to be significantly associated with 
the likelihood of a misstatement to result in auditor litigation. In other words, in a 
multivariate analysis I do not find evidence that a recent merger (Merger) or issuance of an 
IPO (IPO) by a misstateing client significantly affects the likelihood of auditor misstatement-
based litigation. I also do not find evidence that the amount of concentration of share 
ownership (Share_Diffusion) of misstating clients affects auditor litigation.  
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Lastly, I do not find that misstatements of riskier clients are more likely to result in 
auditor litigation. Specifically, the coefficients on Sales_Growth, Lit_Ind, Receivables_Ratio, 
and Inventory_Ratio are not positive and significant. Overall, my results suggest that several 
auditor, misstatement, and client characteristics are important in predicting auditor 
misstatement-based litigation. However, I find that misstatement severity is the primary 
driver of auditor litigation. 
Additional Analysis: The Sarbanes Oxley Act and Non-audit Services 
In an effort to strengthen auditor independence and/or the appearance of auditor 
independence, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 banned a significant number of non-audit 
services that could be provided to an audit client by an engaged auditor (SOX 2002).53 While 
the results from my initial analysis indicate that a positive relationship exists between the 
magnitude and proportion of non-audit services provided by an engaged auditor to a 
misstating client and the likelihood of auditor litigation, I expect that this association may 
vary across the pre and post-SOX time periods. Table 6 presents the results of model (2), 
which adds the interaction of Fees and Sox to model (1). Consistent with Table 5, the model 
is estimated for 1,673 observations, consisting of 65 misstatements that resulted in auditor 
litigation and 1,608 misstatements that did not result in auditor litigation. The analysis also 
includes an investigation of the impact of the magnitude of non-audit service fees (i.e., first  
                                                 
53 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 prohibits audit firms from providing any of the following services to a 
publicly traded audit client: (1) bookkeeping and related services; (2) design or implementation of financial 
information systems; (3) appraisal or valuation services; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit outsourcing; (6) 
management or human resources services; (7) investment or broker/dealer services; (8) legal and expert services 
(SOX 2002). 
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two columns) and the proportion of non-audit service fees (i.e., second two columns) for the 
pre and post-SOX time periods on the likelihood that a misstatement results in auditor 
litigation. The area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is approximately 
86 percent for both regressions, which suggests that the logistic model has excellent 
discrimination.54 
Interestingly, I find that the positive association previously documented in Table 5 
between the magnitude and the proportion of non-audit fees and auditor misstatement-based 
litigation is driven by the post-SOX time period. Specifically, the coefficients on LFees and 
Fee_Ratio are positive (negative) and insignificant (significant) in Table 5. This indicates 
that in the pre-SOX time period, the magnitude of non-audit fees is not significantly 
associated with auditor misstatement-based litigation and the proportion of non-audit service 
fees may be negatively associated with auditor misstatement-based litigation. 
                                                 
54 The ROC curve is a graphical plot of the sensitivity versus specificity for a binary classification as a 
discrimination threshold is varied.  An area under the ROC curve of 100 (50) percent would be completely 
informative (uninformative).  Hosmer and Lemeshaw (2000) suggests that an area greater than 70 (80) percent 
represents acceptable (excellent) discrimination.   
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TABLE 6 Sarbanes Oxley Act Sensitivity Test #1 – 
Logistic Regression: Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Auditor Litigation 
 
              Litig = β0 + β1 Fees + β2 Sox + β4 Fees*Sox + β5Tenure + β6 BigN + β7 Revenue +  β8 Num_Issues + β9 Fraud + 
β10                                 Misstate_Length + β11 Price_Change + β12 Reg_Invest + β13 Time_Lapse + β14 
Client_Size + β15 Bankrupt_Delist + β16 Merger + β17 IPO + β18 Sales_Growth + β19 Lit_Ind + β20 
Receivables_Ratio+ β21 Inventory_Ratio + β22 Client_Age + β23 Share_Diffusion + β24-29 ∑i=17 Years + ε       (2) 
 
*, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Tests are one-tailed when signs are predicted.  All 
variables are defined in Table 1.   
   
Analysis Including Interaction of 
Non-Audit Fee Magnitude and Sox 
 
Analysis Including Interaction of Non-
Audit Fee Proportion and Sox   
  
Variable Sign Coefficient Z-Statistic Coefficient Z-Statistic 
Auditor Characteristics:      
LFees + 0.07 0.29 - - 
Fee_Ratio + - - -3.10 -1.85 
Tenure - 0.05 0.58 0.07 0.76 
BigN ? -1.12 -2.01** -1.13 -1.99** 
Sox ? -5.27 -1.76** -4.14 -3.47*** 
Sox*LFees + 0.35 1.61* - - 
Sox*Fee_Ratio + - - 6.21 3.38*** 
Restatement Characteristics:      
Revenue + 0.58 1.80** 0.67 2.11** 
Num_Issues + 0.09 1.42* 0.09 1.43* 
Fraud + 0.96 1.73** 1.06 1.89** 
Misstate_Length ? 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.41 
Price_Change - -1.83 -2.42*** -1.75 -2.25*** 
Reg_Invest + 1.04 2.99*** 1.12 3.16*** 
Time_Lapse ? -0.00 -0.99 -0.00 -1.31* 
Client Characteristics:      
Client_Size + 0.23 1.88** 0.43 5.04*** 
Bankrupt_Delist + 2.37 3.88*** 2.48 4.03*** 
Merger + 0.17 0.54 0.32 0.97 
IPO + 0.25 0.46 0.30 0.54 
Sales_Growth ? 0.11 0.44 0.07 0.28 
Lit_Ind + 0.17 0.51 0.26 0.75 
Receivables_Ratio + 1.02 1.28 1.02 1.29* 
Inventory_Ratio + -3.62 -2.15 -3.28 -2.01 
Client_Age - -0.06 -2.27** -0.06 -2.30*** 
Share_Diffusion - -0.00 -0.76 -0.00 0.46 
Intercept  -5.63 -1.80** -3.76 -2.22*** 
Years  Year controls included but not tabulated 
Joint Tests:   χ 2 Statistic  χ 2 Statistic 
LFees + Sox*LFees + 0.42 8.57*** 3.11 14.72*** 
Sox + Sox*LFees ? -4.92 3.12** 2.07 3.71*** 
N =  1,673  1,673  
Pseudo. R-Square  0.2703  0.2864  
LR Chi-Square Statistic  148.59***  157.44***  
Area under ROC curve  0.8651  0.8710  
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 However, the coefficients on both interaction variables (Sox*LFees and 
Sox*Fee_Ratio) are positive and significant. This suggests that the provision of non-audit 
services to an audit client has a stronger effect on the likelihood of auditor misstatement-
based litigation in the post-SOX time period. In addition the coefficients on the joint tests of 
Fees + Sox*Fees are positive and significant which confirm that the positive association 
between the magnitude and proportion of non-audit fees and auditor misstatement-based 
litigation is driven by the SOX time period. Thus, regarding the tests of the first hypothesis, I 
find that misstatements associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater magnitude 
of non-audit fees (LFees) or a greater proportion of non-audit fees (Fee_Ratio) are more 
likely to result in auditor litigation in the post-SOX time period only. This suggests that the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act may have changed a third party’s perception of auditor independence as 
it relates to non-audit services. Thus, the provision of non-audit services in the post-SOX 
time period may result in additional blame placed upon an auditor for a financial statement 
misstatement.  
All other variables retain their sign and significance as documented in the main 
regressions in Table 4 except Time_Lapse and Sox. In both regressions that include the 
interaction of Fees and Sox, Sox becomes negative and significant. This result suggests that 
auditor misstatement-based litigation is less likely in the post-Sarbanes Oxley time period. 
The coefficient on the joint test of Sox and Sox*Fees is negative and significant in the fee 
magnitude regression which confirms this result. However, the coefficient on the joint test of 
Sox and Sox*Fees is positive and significant in the fee proportion regression. Therefore, the 
effect of the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act on the likelihood of auditor misstatement-
based litigation is not clear. In addition, the coefficient on Time_Lapse in the regression that 
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interacts fee proportion with Sox becomes negative and marginally significant. This indicates 
that a longer time lapse between the misstatement period and misstatement disclosure date 
may decrease the likelihood of auditor misstatement-based litigation. 
Additional Analysis: The Overall Impact of the Sarbanes Oxley Act  
While the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 substantially constrained the amount of non-
audit services that could be provided to an audit client by an engaged auditor, the Act also 
included other regulatory changes aimed to increase the quality of financial reporting and to 
restore investor confidence. For example, SOX mandated CEO/CFO certification of financial 
statements, internal control audits, SEC financial statement reviews, and PCAOB auditor 
inspections. Many of these changes have the potential to change the litigation risk affecting 
audit firms. For example, an increase in the number of SEC investigations could ultimately 
increase the number of SEC enforcement actions and lead to more lawsuits against auditors. 
As noted by Ball (2008), the Sarbanes Oxley Act provided the most extensive regulation of 
the financial markets since the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. In order to more fully examine the effect of SOX on the likelihood of auditor litigation 
resulting from financial statement misstatements, I perform an additional analysis where I 
partition my sample into pre-SOX and post-SOX time periods. I re-estimate model (1)55 on 
each individual time period and I use seemingly unrelated estimation to test for coefficient 
differences for all independent variables between the two time periods.  
                                                 
55 Due to data limitations, I exclude BigN, Fraud, Inventory_Ratio, and Years from the model.  Because my pre-
SOX sample is small, these variables do not have adequate variation to be estimable in the pre-SOX time 
period.   
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This estimation technique allows me to combine the parameter estimates and 
associated covariance matrices of the two models into a single parameter vector and 
covariance matrix. This technique is similar to using independent variable interactions; 
however, it is easier to interpret when there are multiple interactions. Because I aim to 
estimate the coefficient differences between the pre-SOX and pos-SOX time periods across 
all independent variables, I utilize the seemingly unrelated estimation technique for ease of 
interpretation.  
Table 7 presents the results of model (1), which is estimated separately for the pre-
SOX and post-SOX time periods. Consistent with Table 5, the model is estimated for 1,673 
observations, consisting of 65 misstatements that resulted in auditor litigation and 1,608 
misstatements that did not result in auditor litigation. These observations consist of 106 pre-
SOX observations and 1,567 post-SOX observations with 11 (54) of the pre-SOX (post-
SOX) observations resulting in litigation. The area under the receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) curve is approximately 97 (84) percent for the pre-SOX (post-SOX) regression, which 
suggests that the logistic model has excellent (acceptable) discrimination.56 
                                                 
56 The ROC curve is a graphical plot of the sensitivity versus specificity for a binary classification as a 
discrimination threshold is varied.  An area under the ROC curve of 100 (50) percent would be completely 
informative (uninformative).  Hosmer and Lemeshaw (2000) suggests that an area greater than 70 (80) percent 
represents acceptable (excellent) discrimination.   
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TABLE 7 Sarbanes Oxley Act Sensitivity Test #2 – 
Logistic Regression: Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Auditor Litigation 
 
 Litig
57
 = β0 + β1 Fees + β2 Tenure + β3 BigN + β4 Sox + β5 Revenue + β6 Num_Issues + β7 Fraud 
+ β8 Misstate_Length + β9 Price_Change + β10 Reg_Invest + β11 Time_Lapse + β12 Client_Size + 
β13 Bankrupt_Delist + β14 Merger + β15 IPO + β16 Sales_Growth + β17 Lit_Ind + β18 
Receivables_Ratio + β19 Inventory_Ratio + β20 Client_Age + β21 Share_Diffusion + β22-28 ∑i=17 
Years + ε      (1) 
 
 *, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Tests are one-tailed when signs are predicted.  All 
variables are defined in Table 1.   
                                                 
57 Due to data limitations, I exclude BigN, Fraud, Inventory_Ratio, and Years from the model.  Because my pre-
SOX sample is small, these variables do not have adequate variation to be estimable in the pre-SOX time 
period.   
  Pre-SOX Time Period Post-SOX Time Period   Coefficient 
Difference   
 
Variable 
 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
Z-Statistic 
 
Coefficient 
 
Z-Statistic 
χ 2 Statistic 
Auditor Characteristics:       
LFees + -1.97 -1.72 0.54 3.62*** 4.75** 
Tenure - -2.26 -2.15** 0.01 0.93 4.62** 
BigN ? -- -- -- -- -- 
Sox ? -- -- -- -- -- 
Restatement Characteristics:       
Revenue + 2.33 1.58* 0.71 2.15** 1.15 
Num_Issues + -0.29 -0.62 0.12 1.83** 0.77 
Fraud + -- -- -- -- -- 
Misstate_Length ? -0.00 -1.50 0.00 0.48 2.35 
Price_Change - -3.65 -0.95 -1.85 -1.36* 0.20 
Reg_Invest + 6.45 2.02** 0.89 2.81*** 3.00* 
Time_Lapse ? 0.01 1.79* -0.00 -1.07 3.80** 
Client Characteristics:       
Client_Size + 2.72 2.47*** 0.13 1.05 5.44** 
Bankrupt_Delist + 6.00 2.93*** 2.30 2.81*** 2.82** 
Merger + -0.62 -0.57 0.22 0.66 0.55 
IPO + -3.57 -1.44 0.19 0.66 2.19 
Sales_Growth ? 1.99 2.95*** 0.05 0.26 7.80*** 
Lit_Ind + -1.35 -0.85 0.08 0.23 0.77 
Receivables_Ratio + 6.17 1.06 1.52 1.73* 0.62 
Inventory_Ratio + -- -- -- -- -- 
Client_Age - 0.02 0.17 -0.10 -4.00*** 0.73 
Share_Diffusion - 0.02 1.81 -0.00 -1.61* 3.60* 
Intercept  4.86 0.73 -11.04 -6.98***  
Years --  
N =  106  1,567   
Pseudo. R-Square  0.6369  0.2283   
LR Chi-Square Statistic  45.00***  107.29***   
Area under ROC curve  0.9742  0.8378   
64 
 
 
 
Interestingly, I find much variation across the two time periods. First, consistent with 
the previous fees analysis in Table 6, I find that the positive association between the 
magnitude of non-audit fees and auditor misstatement-based litigation is driven by the post-
SOX time period. Specifically, the coefficient on LFees is negative (positive) and 
insignificant (significant) in the pre-SOX (post-SOX) regression in Table 7. In addition, the 
chi-square statistic is significant which confirms that a significant difference between the two 
coefficients exists. This indicates that in the pre-SOX time period, the magnitude of non-
audit fees is not significantly associated with auditor misstatement-based litigation. However, 
in the post-SOX time period the magnitude of non-audit fees is positively associated with 
auditor misstatement-based litigation. Thus, regarding the tests of the first hypothesis, I find 
that misstatements associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater magnitude of 
non-audit fees (LFees) are more likely to result in auditor litigation in the post-SOX time 
period only. This suggests that the Sarbanes Oxley Act may have changed a third party’s 
perception of auditor independence as it relates to non-audit services. Thus, the provision of 
non-audit services in the post-SOX time period may result in additional blame placed upon 
an auditor for a financial statement misstatement.  
Regarding the tests of the second hypothesis, I do find empirical evidence that auditor 
tenure is associated with auditor misstatement-based litigation in the pre-SOX time period. 
Specifically, the coefficient on Tenure is negative (positive) and significant (insignificant) in 
the pre-SOX (post-SOX) regression. The chi-square statistic is significant which confirms 
that a significant difference between the two coefficients exists. This indicates that in the pre-
SOX time period, the positive relationship between auditor tenure and perceived audit quality 
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documented in the prior literature (Ghosh and Moon 2005) exists in the misstatement-based 
litigation setting. 
Consistent with the earlier findings in Table 5, I find that misstatements that include a 
revenue recognition issue or a regulatory investigation are more likely to result in auditor 
litigation for both time periods. Specifically, the coefficient on Revenue is positive and 
significant in both regressions and there is no significant difference between the two 
coefficients. The coefficient on Reg_Invest is positive and significant in both regressions, but 
there is a significant difference between the two coefficients. The coefficient on Reg_Invest 
is much greater in the pre-SOX regression which indicates that the presence of regulatory 
investigations in the pre-SOX time period has a stronger effect on the likelihood of auditor 
litigation to result from financial statement misstatements than the presence of regulatory 
investigations in the post-SOX time period. However, I find that misstatements with a greater 
number of accounting rule application (i.e., FASB/GAAP) failures and misstatements that 
have a greater stock price decline at the misstatement disclosure date are more likely to result 
in auditor litigation in the post-SOX time period only. Specifically, the coefficient on 
Num_Issues is negative (positive) and insignificant (significant) in the pre-SOX (post-SOX) 
regression, and the coefficient on Price_Change is negative (negative) and insignificant 
(significant) in the pre-SOX (post-SOX) regression. Consistent with the earlier findings in 
Table 5, I find that the number of days restated (Misstate_Length) is not significantly 
associated with auditor litigation in either time period. However, I do find that a significant 
relationship exists between auditor litigation and the length of time between the misstatement 
disclosure date and the misstatement period-ending date (Time_Lapse) in the pre-SOX time 
period. Specifically, the coefficient on Time_Lapse is positive and marginally significant in 
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the pre-SOX regression. This indicates that auditor litigation was more likely in the pre-SOX 
time period when the disclosure of the misstatement was delayed. 
With respect to client characteristics, I find that the coefficient on Client_Size is 
positive (positive) and significant (insignificant) in the pre-SOX (post-SOX) regression and 
there is a significant difference between the two coefficients. This indicates that 
misstatements of larger clients are more likely to result in auditor litigation in the pre-SOX 
time period. Consistent with the earlier findings, I find that misstatements associated with 
clients that went bankrupt or delisted from the stock exchange shortly following the 
misstatement (Bankrupt_Delist) are more likely to result in auditor litigation in both time 
periods. However, the effect is stronger in the pre-SOX period as the coefficient is greater in 
the pre-SOX time period, and there is a significant difference between the two coefficients. 
Consistent with the earlier findings, I do not find evidence that a recent merger (Merger), 
issuance of an IPO (IPO), or operations in a risky industry (Lit_Ind) by a misstating client 
affects the likelihood of a misstatement to result in auditor litigation. However, I do find that 
misstating clients with greater sales growth (Sales_Growth) and a greater proportion of 
accounts receivables (Receivables_Ratio) are more likely to result in auditor litigation in the 
pre-SOX and post-SOX time periods, respectively. In addition, I find that misstatements 
issued by older clients (Client_Age) and misstatements issued by clients with a greater 
diffusion of share ownership are less likely to result in auditor litigation in the post-SOX time 
period. Overall, my results suggest that the ability of the auditor, misstatement, and client 
characteristics to predict auditor misstatement-based litigation changed following the 
enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. 
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Sensitivity Analyses: The Changing Nature of Misstatements 
 In a recent study commissioned by the U.S. Treasury Department, Scholz (2008) 
finds that the nature of financial statement restatements has changed over the last decade. 
Specifically, she finds that, from 1997 through 2006, the number of restatements has 
increased while the severity of the restatements has decreased (Scholz 2008). Because my 
sample is comprised of misstatements disclosed from 2000 – 2007, it is likely that it consists 
of some less severe misstatements that may not be viewed as audit failures. As a result, I 
perform two sensitivity tests that attempt to control for this phenomena. First, I limit my 
analysis to non-trivial misstatements and I re-estimated model (1). Specifically, I include a 
misstatement in my model if it meets any of the following conditions: (1) the misstatement is 
associated with a revenue recognition issue; (2) the misstatement disclosed the presence of 
fraud or irregularities; (3) the misstating client experienced a regulatory investigation; (4) the 
number of accounting application (i.e., GAAP/FASB) failures disclosed in the misstatements 
was in the upper quartile for the entire sample; (5) the three-day market-adjusted return 
around the misstatement disclosure date was in the lower quartile for the entire sample. 
Second, I include a misstatement magnitude variable (Misstate_Magnitude) that captures the 
impact of the restatement on the current year retained earnings scaled by the prior year 
retained earnings. This variable controls for the amount of accounting manipulation for 
which an auditor may be held accountable. 
Table 8 presents the results of these sensitivity tests. Limiting my sample to non-
trivial misstatements reduces my sample size from 1,673 observations to 1,015 observations. 
The area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is 84 percent, which 
suggests that the logistic model retains its excellent discrimination. My results are largely 
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consistent with this exclusion of observations. Specifically, all the coefficients retain their 
sign and significance except that the coefficients on Revenue and Num_Issues become 
insignificant, and the coefficient on Sox becomes positive and marginally significant. In other 
words, I find that litigation is more likely to follow non-trivial misstatements that are 
associated with Fraud, regulatory investigations (Reg_Invest), larger stock price declines at 
the misstatement disclosure date (Price_Chg), and engagement fees that consist of a greater 
magnitude of non-audit service fees (Fees). However, when limited to non-trivial 
misstatements, I do not find that the number of accounting rule application (i.e., 
FASB/GAAP) failures (Num_Issues) or the presence of a revenue recognition failure 
(Revenue) has an incremental effect on the likelihood of auditor misstatement-based 
litigation. The negative and significant coefficient on Sox indicates that auditor misstatement-
based litigation resulting from non-trivial misstatements is less likely in the post-Sarbanes 
Oxley time period. This result is largely consistent with the result in Table 5. In sum, my 
results are largely robust to an exclusion of trivial misstatements issued during my time 
period. While the number and nature of restatements has changed over the last decade, the 
determinants of auditor misstatement-based litigation appear to have remained relatively 
constant. 
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TABLE 8 Sensitivity Test – 
Logistic Regression: Financial Statement Misstatements Resulting in Auditor Litigation 
 
Litig = β0 + β1 LFees + β2 Tenure + β3 BigN + β4 Sox + β5 Revenue + β6 Num_Issues + β7 Fraud +  
β8 Misstate_Length + β9 Price_Change + β10 Reg_Invest + β11 Time_Lapse + β12 Client_Size +  
β13 Bankrupt_Delist + β14 Merger + β15 IPO + β16 Sales_Growth + β17 Lit_Ind + β18 Receivables_Ratio + β19 
Inventory_Ratio + β20 Client_Age +  β21 Share_Diffusion + β 22-28 ∑i=17 Years +   ε      (1) 
Client Characteristics:      
Client_Size + 0.29 2.20** 0.99 1.58* 
Bankrupt_Delist + 1.31 1.50* - - 
Merger + -0.08 -0.21 -2.58 -1.38 
IPO + 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.16 
Sales_Growth ? 0.21 0.71 -0.75 0.79 
Lit_Ind + 0.30 0.83 0.91 0.52 
Receivables_Ratio + 0.50 0.53 0.12 0.03 
Inventory_Ratio + -4.96 -2.44 -41.3 -1.53 
Client_Age - -0.06 -2.37*** -0.48 -1.80** 
Share_Diffusion - -0.00 -0.95 -0.01 -1.96** 
Intercept N/A -7.24 -3.52*** -37.3 -2.48*** 
Years  Year controls included but not tabulated 
N = 1,015  520 
Pseudo. R-Square 0.2525  .6556 
LR Chi-Square Statistic 107.98***  64.79*** 
Area under ROC curve 0.8478  0.9863 
*, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Tests are one-tailed when signs are predicted.  All 
variables are defined in Table 1.   
                                                 
58 Due to data limitations, I exclude BigN, Sox, and Bankrupt_Delist from the model.  Because inclusion of 
Misstate_Magnitude reduces my sample size, these variables do not have adequate variation to be estimable. 
   
Analysis Limited to 
Non-Trivial Misstatements 
 
Analysis Including 
Misstatement Magnitude
58 
  
Variable Sign Coefficient Z-Statistic Coefficient Z-Statistic 
Auditor Characteristics:      
LFees + 0.26 1.84*** 2.25 2.15*** 
Tenure - 0.06 0.58 -0.77 -1.54* 
BigN ? -1.16 -2.00** - - 
Sox ? -1.34 -1.35* - - 
Restatement Characteristics: 
Revenue + 0.40 1.18 3.09 1.42* 
Num_Issues + 0.05 0.83 0.20 0.53 
Fraud + 0.83 1.49* 4.50 1.17 
Misstate_Length ? -0.00 -0.17 -0.00 0.52 
Price_Change - -2.57 -3.23*** -9.74 -2.15** 
Reg_Invest + 0.83 2.33** -0.36 -0.10 
Time_Lapse ? -0.00 -0.87 -0.01 -1.49* 
Misstate_Magnitude + -  -0.00 -1.51 
70 
 
 
 
My second sensitivity test includes a misstatement magnitude variable 
(Misstate_Magnitude) that captures the impact of the restatement on the current year retained 
earnings scaled by the prior year retained earnings. Inclusion of this variable significantly 
reduces my sample size from 1,673 observations to 520 observations. Of these 520 
observations, only 9 result in auditor litigation. As a result of the decreased sample size, I 
exclude BigN, Sox, and Bankrupt_Delist from the model because these variables do not have 
adequate variation to be estimable. The area under the receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) curve is 98 percent, which suggests that the logistic model retains its excellent 
discrimination. Conclusions regarding my first hypothesis do not change with this regression 
model. In other words, I find a positive and significant association between non-audit service 
fees and the likelihood of auditor misstatement-based litigation. However, in addition, I find 
some support for my second hypothesis. Specifically, the coefficient on auditor Tenure is 
negative and marginally significant. This indicates that the likelihood of auditor litigation 
resulting from a past financial statement misstatement is greater when the misstatement 
involves a shorter auditor-client relationship. Thus, in this reduced sample, I do find that 
auditor tenure may influence auditor culpability for past misstatements. 
Consistent with the main results, I find that misstatements that include a revenue 
recognition issue (Revenue) and misstatements that have a greater stock price decline at the 
misstatement disclosure date (Price_Change) are more likely to result in auditor litigation. 
However, I do not find that misstatements with a greater number of accounting rule 
application (i.e., GAAP/FASB) failures (Num_Issues), misstatements disclosing the presence 
of fraud or irregularities (Fraud), or misstatements involving clients with regulatory 
investigations (Reg_Invest) are more likely to result in auditor litigation. Rather, I find a 
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negative and marginally significant coefficient on Time_Lapse which indicates that 
misstatements with a shorter time span between the misstatement period and misstatement 
disclosure date may be more likely to result in auditor litigation. Similar to Palmrose and 
Scholz (2004), I do not find evidence that the impact of the restatement on the current year 
retained earnings (Misstate_Magnitude) is significantly related to the likelihood of auditor 
misstatement-based litigation. Overall, these results suggest that misstatement severity is an 
important determinant of auditor misstatement-based litigation. 
 With respect to client characteristics, my results are largely consistent with the main 
results. Specifically, all coefficients on the client characteristic variables retain their sign and 
significance except that the coefficient on Share_Diffusion becomes negative and significant. 
This indicates that as the ownership of common shares becomes more dispersed the 
likelihood of auditor misstatement-based litigation decreases. In sum, after controlling for 
effect of the misstatement on a client’s retained earnings, I still find that misstatement 
severity and non-audit service fees have a positive influence on the likelihood of auditor 
misstatement-based litigation.  
Descriptive Statistics: Misstatement-based Litigation Resulting in Auditor Settlements 
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics of my sample of auditor misstatement-based 
lawsuits where the resolution of the lawsuit could be determined and where the data required 
to run my empirical tests was available.59  
                                                 
59 The resolution of thirteen lawsuits could not be determined by the available court documents.  The alleged 
equity, income, or stock inflation could not be determined by the available court documents. 
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Overall, I find that 40 percent of auditor misstatement-based litigation results in an 
auditor settlement. With respect to my auditor characteristics, the univariate mean and 
median tests presented in Table 9 indicate that misstatement-based auditor litigation is more 
likely to result in an auditor settlement when the misstatement is associated with engagement 
fees that consist of a greater magnitude (LFees) of non-audit services. The distribution of 
non-audit fees is right-skewed so I use the natural logarithm of this value to control for non-
audit fees in my multivariate empirical tests. I do not find any significant relationship 
between the proportion of engagement fees that consist of non-audit service fees (Fee_Ratio) 
and the likelihood of an auditor settlement. In addition, my univariate tests do not indicate 
that a relationship exists between auditor tenure (Tenure) or auditor size (BigN) and the 
likelihood of an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation. However, 
my univariate chi-square tests do suggest that auditor settlements resulting from 
misstatement-based litigation are less likely in the post-SOX time period (Sox).  
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TABLE 9 
Descriptive Statistics:  
 
Auditor Misstatement-Based Litigation Resulting in Auditor Settlements 
N = 50 lawsuits6 
 
 
 
*, **, *** indicate that mean/median tests are significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  All variables 
are defined in Table 1. 
                                                 
6 The resolution of thirteen lawsuits could not be determined by the available court documents.  The alleged 
equity, income, or stock inflation of two lawsuits could not be determined by the available court documents. 
4 Non-audit fees reported in dollars (not in logged value for ease of interpretation). 
5 Total assets reported in millions of dollars (not in logged value for ease of interpretation). 
  Resulting in an Auditor Settlement 
 
N = 20 
 Not Resulting in an 
Auditor Settlement 
N = 30 
Continuous Variables  Mean  Median  Mean    Median 
Non-Audit_Fees
4
  8,737,707**  2,795,000  3,663,916  691,801 
Fee_Ratio  53 percent  59 percent  46 percent  46 percent 
Tenure  4 years*  4 years  5 years  5 years 
Num_Issues  3.5**  2.5  4  3 
Misstate_Length  862 days**  729 days**  1,113 days  1,094 days 
Stock_Inflate  50 percent*  50 percent*  56 percent   52 percent 
Time_Lapse 
Client_Size
5
  
Acct_Inflate 
Client_Age 
Share_ Diffusion 
 
Discrete Variables 
 188 days 
77,731** 
16.1 billion** 
14 years 
42 shares** 
 136 days* 
22,933** 
147 million* 
14 years 
25 shares 
 210 days 
54,060 
564 million 
13 years 
95 shares 
 164 days 
1,950 
38.7 million 
12 years 
30 shares 
  Frequency  Percent Frequency Percent 
BigN  19  95 27 90 
Sox  12***  60 28 93 
Revenue  7  35 13 43 
Fraud  2  7 2 10 
Reg_Invest  9  45 9 30 
Bankrupt_Delist  0*  0 3 10 
Merger  7  35 12 40 
IPO  4**  20 1 3 
Lit_Ind  3  30 9 15 
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The univariate tests in Table 9 provide conflicting evidence as to whether or not the 
severity of the misstatement influences the likelihood of an auditor settlement resulting from 
miststatement-based litigation. Specifically, the univariate results indicate that an auditor 
settlement is more likely to result from misstatement-based litigation when the amount of 
plaintiffs’ alleged inflation in net income or equity is greater (Acct_Inflate). However, for all 
other severity measures, either a statistical association does not exist or the relationship is 
negative. Specifically, the univariate results indicate that an auditor settlement is more likely 
to result from misstatement-based litigation when the misstatement is associated with fewer 
accounting application (i.e., FASB/GAAP) failures (Num_Issues), a shorter misstated time 
period (Misstate_Length), and smaller alleged stock price inflation (Stock_Inflate). There is 
no significant difference in the presence of fraud (Fraud), a regulatory investigation 
(Reg_Invest), or a revenue recognition failure (Revenue) between auditor misstatement-based 
lawsuits that result in auditor settlements and those that do not. In addition, my univariate 
tests indicate that auditor settlements are more likely when the time between the 
misstatement and the disclosure of the misstatement is shorter (Time_Lapse). Overall, the 
univariate tests seem to suggest that it is the size of the plaintiffs’ claims that drive auditor 
settlements rather than the severity of the financial statement misstatement. 
With respect to client characteristics, the univariate tests in Table 9 indicate that 
misstatement-based litigation is more likely to result in an auditor settlement when the 
misstatement is issued by a larger client (Client_Size). The distribution of total assets audited 
is right-skewed so I use the natural logarithm of this value to control for client size in my 
multivariate empirical tests. I also find that misstatement-based litigation involving 
misstatements issued by clients with more concentrated ownership (Share_Diffusion) and 
75 
 
 
 
those with recent initial public offerings (IPO) are more likely to result in an auditor 
settlement. I also find that auditor settlements are less likely for clients that go bankrupt or 
delist from the stock exchange shortly following the misstatement (Bankrupt_Delist). 
However, my univariate tests do not indicate that client age (Client_Age), operations in a 
risky industry (Rsky), or recent merger activity (Merger) varies across the two groups.  
Multivariate Results: Misstatement-based Litigation Resulting in Auditor Settlements 
Table 10 presents the results of model (3), which estimates the likelihood that 
misstatement-based litigation results in an auditor settlement. This model is estimated for 50 
observations, consisting of 20 lawsuits that result in an auditor settlement and 30 lawsuits 
that do not result in an auditor settlement. The analysis includes an investigation of the 
impact of the magnitude of non-audit service fees (i.e., first two columns) and the proportion 
of non-audit service fees (i.e., second two columns) on the likelihood that a misstatement-
based litigation results in an auditor settlement. The area under the receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) curve is 95 percent for both regressions, which suggests that the logistic 
model has excellent discrimination.60  
                                                 
60 The ROC curve is a graphical plot of the sensitivity versus specificity for a binary classification as a 
discrimination threshold is varied.  An area under the ROC curve of 100 (50) percent would be completely 
informative (uninformative).  Hosmer and Lemeshaw (2000) suggests that an area greater than 70 (80) percent 
represents acceptable (excellent) discrimination.   
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TABLE 10 
Logistic Regression: Misstatement-based Litigation Resulting in Auditor Settlements 
 
Settle =  β0 + β1 Acct_Inflate + β2 Stock_Inflate + β3 Fees + β4 Tenure + β5 BigN +  β6 Sox +  β7 Revenue + β8 
Num_Issues + β9 Fraud + β10 Misstate_Length + β11 Reg_Invest +  β12 Time_Lapse + β13 Client_Size + β14 
Merger + β15 IPO + β16 Lit_Ind +  β17 Client_Age + β18 Share_Diffusion + ε  (3)    
 
*, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Tests are one-tailed when signs are predicted.  All 
variables are defined in Table 1.   
  Analysis Including 
Non-Audit Fee Magnitude 
Analysis Including 
Non-Audit Fee 
Proportion 
  
Variable Sign Coefficient Z-Statistic Coefficient Z-Statistic 
Size of Claims:      
Acct_Inflate + 0.00 1.98** 0.00 1.99** 
Stock_Inflate + 0.08 2.24** 0.08 2.25** 
Auditor Characteristics:      
LFees + -0.05 -0.09   
Fee_Ratio +   -0.43 -0.16 
Tenure - -0.10 -0.21 -0.11 -0.24 
BigN ? -2.33 -0.91 -2.36 -0.91 
Sox ? -9.64 -2.51*** -9.72 -2.50*** 
Restatement Characteristics: 
Revenue + -3.95 -1.93 -3.98 -1.99 
Num_Issues + -0.48 -1.37 -0.49 -1.42 
Fraud + 8.14 1.50* 8.20 1.54* 
Misstate_Length ? 0.00 1.60 0.00 1.60 
Reg_Invest + -3.63 -1.53 -3.70 -1.52 
Time_Lapse ? 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.80 
Client Characteristics:      
Client_Size + 0.48 1.10 0.48 1.33* 
Merger + -1.16 -0.87 -1.21 -0.92 
IPO + 5.81 2.06** 5.86 2.18** 
Lit_Ind + 0.57 0.32 0.53 0.29 
Client_Age - 0.03 0.33 0.03 0.25 
Share_Diffusion - -0.02 -1.47* -0.02 -1.52* 
Intercept N/A 9.94 1.59 9.78 2.09** 
      
N =  50  50  
Pseudo. R-Square  0.5757  0.6760  
LR Chi-Square Statistic  38.75***  38.77***  
Area under ROC curve  0.9500  0.9500  
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Regarding the test of the third hypothesis, I find that lawsuits are more likely to result 
in an auditor settlement when the size of the plaintiffs’ claims is larger. Specifically, in both 
regressions I find that the coefficients on Acct_Inflate and Stock_Inflate are positive and 
significant. This suggests that as the plaintiffs’ alleged inflation in net income, equity, or 
share price increases, the likelihood of an auditor settlement increases. This provides some 
support for the view that auditors may be forced to settle lawsuits when the size of the claims 
becomes large. Further, only one other misstatement severity measure enters the model 
significantly. Specifically, the coefficient on Fraud is positive and significant in both 
regressions indicating that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation 
is more likely when the misstatement is associated with fraud. The coefficients on all other 
severity measures (e.g., Revenue, Num_Issues, Misstate_Length, and Reg_Invest) are 
insignificant in both regressions. This suggests that misstatement severity may be less 
important than the size of the plaintiffs’ claims in predicting the likelihood that an auditor 
settlement results from misstatement-based litigation. 
With respect to auditor characteristics, I find that only Sox enters the model 
significantly. Specifically, the coefficient on Sox is negative and significant in both 
regressions indicating that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation 
is less likely in the post-Sarbanes Oxley time period. With respect to client characteristics, I 
find some evidence that auditor litigation involving larger clients is more likely to result in an 
auditor settlement. Specifically, the coefficient on Client_Size is positive and marginally 
significant in the regression model that includes the proportion of non-audit fees as a 
regressor. In addition, I also find that misstatement-based litigation involving misstatements 
issued by clients with more concentrated ownership (Share_Diffusion) and those with recent 
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initial public offerings (IPO) are more likely to result in an auditor settlement. Overall, my 
results suggest that the size of the plaintiffs’ claims, the presence of fraudulent activity, and 
the increased auditor legal liability surrounding IPOs are the primary drivers of auditor 
settlements resulting from misstatement-based litigation. 
Sensitivity Analysis: Controlling for Self-selection Bias 
 Table 10 requires a misstatement to result in auditor litigation to be included in the 
auditor settlement analysis. This criterion artificially creates a self-selection bias because the 
observations in my settlement analysis are limited to misstatements involving litigation and 
may have characteristics associated with litigation that are also associated with an auditor 
settlement. This self-selection bias makes it difficult to empirically examine the determinants 
of an auditor settlement because there may be other factors associated with litigation that also 
affect the likelihood of an auditor settlement. In order to control for this self-selection bias, I 
use a two-stage approach (Heckman 1979; Wooldridge 2002). My first stage consists of 
estimating the likelihood that a financial statement misstatement results in auditor litigation 
(i.e., estimating model 1). I then control for the determinants of auditor litigation by 
calculating the inverse Mills ratio (Inverse_Mills) from this first-stage regression and using 
this ratio as an additional independent variable in my settlement analysis (i.e., second-stage 
regression).  
79 
 
 
 
The Inverse Mills ratio equals the standard normal density function divided by the 
cumulative distribution function; it is a decreasing function of the probability that an 
observation is selected into the sample (Heckman 1979). Inclusion of this ratio controls for 
the potential endogeniety between auditor litigation and auditor settlements. A significant 
coefficient on Inverse_Mills would suggest that auditor litigation and auditor settlements are 
endogeneous. 
Table 11 presents the results of model (3), which estimates the likelihood that 
misstatement-based litigation results in an auditor settlement and includes the Inverse_Mills 
ratio as a self-selection control variable. The regression reported in the first two columns 
includes the Inverse_Mills ratio but excludes LFees because the two variables are highly 
correlated and the model is not estimable with both included. The regression reported in the 
second two columns includes the Inverse_Mills ratio and the proportion of non-audit service 
fees. The area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is 97 percent for both 
regressions, which suggests that the logistic model has excellent discrimination.61  
                                                 
61 The ROC curve is a graphical plot of the sensitivity versus specificity for a binary classification as a 
discrimination threshold is varied.  An area under the ROC curve of 100 (50) percent would be completely 
informative (uninformative).  Hosmer and Lemeshaw (2000) suggests that an area greater than 70 (80) percent 
represents acceptable (excellent) discrimination.   
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TABLE 11 Sensitivity Test – 
Logistic Regression: Misstatement-Based Litigation Resulting in Auditor Settlements  
 
 Settle =  β0 + β1 Acct_Inflate + β2 Stock_Inflate + β3 Fees + β4 Tenure + β5 BigN +  β6 Sox +  β7 
Revenue + β8 Num_Issues + β9 Fraud + β10 Misstate_Length + β11 Reg_Invest +  β12 Time_Lapse + β13 
Client_Size + β14 Merger + β15 IPO + β16 Lit_Ind +  β17 Client_Age + β18 Share_Diffusion + β18 
Inv_Mills  + ε       (3)      
 
 *, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  All variables are defined in Table 1.   
   
Analysis Including Inverse Mills 
Self-Selection Control 
 
Analysis Including Non-Audit Fee 
Proportion and Inverse Mills Self-
Selection Control 
  
Variable Sign Coefficient Z-Statistic Coefficient Z-Statistic 
Size of Claims:      
Acct_Inflate + 0.00 1.98** 0.00 1.91** 
Stock_Inflate + 0.14 1.82** 0.14 1.75** 
Auditor Characteristics:      
Fee_Ratio + - - -0.01 -0.00 
Tenure - -0.25 -0.42 -0.25 -0.40 
BigN ? -0.14 -0.03 -0.14 -0.03 
Sox ? -23.22 -2.03** -23.22 -1.99** 
Restatement 
Characteristics: 
     
Revenue + -8.12 -1.95 -8.12 -1.95 
Num_Issues + -0.65 -0.93 -0.65 -0.92 
Fraud + 17.11 1.53* 17.11 1.52* 
Misstate_Length ? 0.01 1.62 0.01 1.62 
Reg_Invest + -2.83 -1.03 -2.83 -0.95 
Time_Lapse ? 0.01 1.10 0.01 1.04 
Client Characteristics:      
Client_Size + 2.39 1.92* 2.39 1.81* 
Merger + 1.16 0.63 1.15 0.60 
IPO + 9.89 2.05** 9.89 2.05** 
Lit_Ind + 6.96 1.37* 6.96 1.36* 
Client_Age - -0.13 -0.82 -0.13 -0.78 
Share_Diffusion - -0.05 -1.85** -0.05 -1.83** 
Inv_Mills ? 9.12 1.82* 9.12 1.77* 
Intercept ? -10.49 -0.89 -9.02 -0.78 
  
N =  50  50  
Pseudo. R-Square  0.6864  0.6864  
LR Chi-Square Statistic  46.19***  46.19  
Area under ROC curve  0.9700  0.9700  
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My results are largely consistent to earlier findings when I include this self-selection 
control variable. Specifically, all the coefficients retain their sign and significance except that 
the coefficient on Client_Size becomes positive and marginally significant in both 
regressions and the coefficient on Lit_Ind becomes positive and significant. This indicates 
that after controlling for the possibly endogeniety between auditor litigation and auditor 
settlements, I find that auditors are more likely to settle out of court when the misstatement-
based litigation involves larger clients or those that operate in risky industries. I also find the 
coefficient on the Inverse_Mills ratio to be positive and marginally significant indicating that 
a self-selection bias does exist. However, after controlling for this bias, I still find that a 
positive association exists between the size of plaintiffs’ claims and the likelihood of an 
auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation. 
Descriptive Statistics: Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior 
As previously discussed, the second part of my study examines the behavior of 
auditors following misstatement-based litigation at the auditor city (i.e. audit office) level. I 
employ a matching procedure where I match a litigated audit office to a non-litigated office 
of similar size. I then collect all financial statements issued by clients of the litigated and 
non-litigated audit offices in the year preceding and following litigation. My empirical tests 
examine the subsequent auditor behavior associated with all clients (except the litigated 
client) serviced by a given litigated and non-litigated audit office. Table 12 presents summary 
statistics for the criteria I use to match litigated and non-litigated audit offices. Table 12 
indicates that the audit offices used in my empirical tests are of similar size. Specifically, for 
both matches (i.e. match #1 and match #3) based on assets audited in the prior year, the 
litigated audit offices in my sample audited a slightly larger dollar amount of total assets in 
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the year prior to litigation in comparison to the non-litigated offices in my sample but the 
total difference was not statistically significant. Also, for my match based on clients audited 
in the prior year, the litigated audit offices in my sample audited the same number of clients 
in the prior year as the non-litigated audit offices in my sample. In sum, the audit offices 
examined in my empirical tests are of similar size. This is necessary so that my empirical 
tests will isolate differences in auditor behavior attributable to litigation rather than 
differences attributable to the amount of resources, personnel, or audit workload.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 12 
Auditor Office Matching Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
  Litigated Auditors Non-litigated Auditors 
     
  Mean 
 
 Median  Mean  Median 
Match #1: Total Assets 
Audited in the Prior Year 
 
 108,228 
million 
 58,800 
million 
 101,124 
million 
 59,699 
million 
Match #2: Total Clients 
Audited in the Prior Year 
 
  
22 
  
14 
  
22 
  
14 
Match #3: Total Assets 
Audited in the Prior Year 
where Non-litigated 
Auditor is from the same 
audit firm 
 
 87,176 
million 
 58,880 
million 
 79,697 
million 
 56,736 
million 
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Multivariate Results: Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Reporting 
Decisions 
As stated earlier, I predict that litigation will induce auditors in all subsequent audit 
engagements to engage in more conservative behavior by monitoring and reducing 
management’s reporting flexibility (i.e. reducing client reported discretionary accruals) and 
increasing the amount of time spent on audit engagements (i.e., lengthening the audit report 
lag). I will first report my discretionary accruals results following by my audit report lag 
results. 
Match Based on Total Assets Audited in the Prior Year 
Table 13 presents the results of Model (4) and Model (5) which estimates signed 
(Panel A and Panel B) and absolute value (Panel C) client discretionary accruals reported by 
clients of the litigated and non-litigated auditors in the two years surrounding litigation when 
the auditor match is based on total assets audited in the prior year.62 This model investigates 
whether the magnitude of post-litigation discretionary accruals reported by clients of litigated 
auditors differs from the magnitude of post-litigation discretionary accruals reported by 
clients of non-litigated auditors.
                                                 
62 Because my sample includes multiple observations for a given client, my test statistics are based on Roger’s 
standard errors which are White standard errors adjusted for possible correlation of residuals within firm 
clusters (Petersen 2006). 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 For the absolute value and positive  discretionary accrual analysis, I use a truncated tobit regression which employs a lower (upper) bound of zero for the 
positive (negative) discretionary accrual values.  Utilizing an ordinary least squares (OLS) approach would lead to estimates biased toward zero (Greene 
2003). 
TABLE 13 
Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior – 
Discretionary Accruals Reported by Clients
6
 – 
Match Based on Total Assets Audited in the Prior Year 
 
Accr = β0 + β1 Lit + β2 Post + β3 Lit*Post + β4 BigN + β5 Client_Size + β6 OCF + β7 Abs_TAC + β8 Lev + β9 Client_Age + β10 Tenure + β11 
Prior_AA + β12 Pr_Bank + β13 Chg_NI + β14 New_Fin + β15 Loss + β16 Growth +β 17-31 ∑i=115 Industry + ε    (5) 
          Panel A: Signed Discretionary Accruals Panel B: Positive Discretionary Accruals Panel C: Absolute Value Discretionary Accruals 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
T-Stat 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
T-Stat 
Predicted Sign  
Coefficient 
 
T-Stat 
Lit ? 0.0015 0.41 ? -0.0020 -0.44 ? -0.0025 -0.73 
Post - -0.0037 -0.90 - -0.0071 -1.40* - -0.0023 -0.60 
Lit*Post - -0.0004 -0.08 - 0.0010 0.17 - -0.0002 -0.03 
BigN - -0.0082 -0.45 - -0.0298 -1.52* - -0.0173 -1.61* 
Client_Size ? -0.0021 -1.97** ? -0.0042 -3.25*** ? -0.0050 -5.19*** 
OCF - -0.4933 -15.41*** - -0.3488 -13.55*** - -0.0850 -3.68*** 
Abs_TAC ? -0.2247 -4.56*** ? 0.1498 2.69*** ? 0.2895 9.88*** 
Lev + 0.2989 3.88*** + 0.0222 2.48** + 0.0048 0.65 
Client_Age ? 0.0002 0.73 ? 0.0001 0.41 ? -0.0003 -1.42 
Tenure - -0.0006 -0.82 - 0.0001 0.13 - 0.0007 1.26 
Prior_AA - 0.0033 0.82 - -0.0071 -1.37* - -0.0080 -1.86** 
Pr_Bank ? -0.1129 -6.25*** ? -0.1081 -6.48*** ? -0.0337 -2.47** 
Chg_NI ? 0.0008 1.76 ? 0.0002 0.32 ? -0.0000 -0.09 
New_Fin ? 0.0028 0.65 ? 0.0085 1.75* ? 0.0093 2.40** 
Loss ? -0.0207 -3.42*** ? -0.0306 -6.57*** ? -0.0181 -4.61*** 
Growth ? -0.0022 -2.72*** ? 0.0002 0.14 ? 0.0036 4.36*** 
Intercept N/A 0.03816 1.55 N/A 0.0918 2.25 N/A 0.1221 2.69*** 
Joint Tests  Coefficient F-Stat  Coefficient F-Stat  Coefficient F-Stat 
Post + Lit*Post - -0.0041 1.68* - -0.0061 2.66** - -0.0025 0.72 
Lit + Lit*Post - 0.0011 0.08 - -0.0010 0.05 - -0.0026 0.55 
N  1,657   731   1,657  
Adj. R-Square  0.6020   -0.2731   -0.1219  
          
*, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Tests are one-tailed when signs are predicted.  All variables are defined in Table 1.  Industry 
controls included but not tabulated. 
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The results indicate that prior to litigation there was no significant difference between 
the discretionary accruals reported by clients of litigated auditors and the discretionary 
accruals reported by clients of non-litigated auditors (i.e., the coefficient on Lit is 
insignificant in all three panels). Panel A indicates that there was no change following 
litigation in the signed and absolute value discretionary accruals reported by clients of non-
litigated auditors (i.e., the coefficient on Post is insignificant in Panel A and Panel C). 
However, the coefficient on Post is negative and marginally significant in Panel B indicating 
that the magnitude of positive discretionary accruals decreased in the year following 
litigation for non-litigated auditors. In all three panels, the coefficient on my interaction 
variable, Lit*Post, is insignificant which indicates that, on average, there is no difference in 
the constraint of absolute value and signed discretionary accruals post-litigation for litigated 
auditors versus non-litigated auditors.  
However, I find that, on average, there has been a significant decrease in the signed 
and positive accruals following litigation for litigated auditors, as the joint test for Post + 
Lit*Post is negative and marginally significant in Panel A and negative and significant in 
Panel B. Taken together, these results suggest that litigation involving a single client may 
cause audit offices to constrain accruals across their entire portfolio of clients. However, the 
joint test for Lit + Lit*Post is insignificant which suggests that following litigation the total 
magnitude of absolute value and signed discretionary accruals does not differ between 
litigated and non-litigated auditors. To summarize the results from Table 13 as they pertain to 
the second hypothesis, auditor litigation is followed by a significant decrease in the 
magnitude of signed and positive discretionary accruals reported by all clients serviced by 
that audit office, but has no effect on the magnitude of absolute value discretionary accruals. 
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Stated differently, audit firms appear to respond to litigation involving a single client by 
requiring more income-decreasing financial reporting from other clients serviced by the same 
office. This finding is consistent with the second hypothesis and suggests that litigation may, 
in fact, cause auditors to change their behavior in future reporting periods. 
With respect to my control variables, in both Panel B and Panel C, I find a negative 
and significant coefficient on BigN which indicates that clients of Big N auditors report, on 
average, a smaller amount of positive and absolute value discretionary accruals. This is 
consistent with Becker et al. (1998) who find that clients of Big 6 auditors report lower 
absolute value discretionary accruals than clients of non-Big 6 auditors. In addition, in all 
panels, I find that, larger clients (Client_Size) report discretionary accruals of smaller 
magnitude. Consistent with prior literature, I find a negative association between 
discretionary accruals and operating cash flows (OCF) and a positive association between 
discretionary accruals and leverage (Lev). In addition, I find that a client’s accrual generating 
potential does affect client reported discretionary accruals as the coefficient on Abs_TAC is 
significant in all three columns. Consistent with Cahan and Zhang (2006), I find that former 
Arthur Andersen clients report signed and absolute value discretionary accruals of smaller 
magnitude (i.e., the coefficient on Prior_AA is negative and significant in Panel B and Panel 
C). In addition, I find that clients who recently issued new equity report a greater amount of 
positive (Panel B) and absolute value (Panel C) discretionary accruals. This is consistent with 
prior literature that finds that managers have an incentive to increase earnings prior to equity 
offers (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998). I also find that Growth clients evidenced by a greater 
market-to-book ratio report a greater (smaller) amount of absolute value (signed) 
discretionary accruals. This is consistent with Smith and Watts (1992) who find that 
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managers of growth clients tend to have more accounting discretion. However, contrary to 
my expectation, I find that financially distressed clients (Pr_Bank and Loss) report 
discretionary accruals (all panels) of smaller magnitude. This unexpected result may be due 
to more auditor constraint of discretionary accruals driven by the increased litigation risk 
associated with these clients. All other control variables do not enter the models significantly. 
Overall, my results on the control variables are largely consistent with the prior literature. 
Match Based on Total Clients Audited in the Prior Year 
Table 14 presents the results of Model (4) and Model (5) which estimates signed 
(Panel A and Panel B) and absolute value (Panel C) client discretionary accruals reported by 
clients of the litigated and non-litigated auditors in the two years surrounding litigation when 
the auditor match is based on total clients audited in the prior year.63 Again, this model 
investigates whether the magnitude of post-litigation discretionary accruals reported by 
clients of litigated auditors differs from the magnitude of post-litigation discretionary 
accruals reported by clients of non-litigated auditors. 
                                                 
63 Because my sample includes multiple observations for a given client, my test statistics are based on Roger’s 
standard errors which are White standard errors adjusted for possible correlation of residuals within firm 
clusters (Petersen 2006). 
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*, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Tests are one-tailed when signs are predicted.  All variables are defined in Table 1.  Industry 
controls included but not tabulated.
                                                 
6 For the absolute value and positive  discretionary accrual analysis, I use a truncated tobit regression which employs a lower (upper) bound of zero for the 
positive (negative) discretionary accrual values.  Utilizing an ordinary least squares (OLS) approach would lead to estimates biased toward zero (Greene 
2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 14 
Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior – 
Discretionary Accruals Reported by Clients
6
 – 
Match Based on Total Clients Audited in the Prior Year 
 
Accr = β0 + β1 Lit + β2 Post + β3 Lit*Post + β4 BigN + β5 Client_Size + β6 OCF + β7 Abs_TAC + β8 Lev + β9 Client_Age + β10 Tenure + β11 Prior_AA + β12 
Pr_Bank + β13 Chg_NI + β14 New_Fin + β15 Loss + β16 Growth +β 17-31 ∑i=115 Industry + ε    (5) 
          Panel A: Signed Discretionary Accruals Panel B: Positive Discretionary Accruals Panel C: Absolute Value Discretionary Accruals 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
T-Stat 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
T-Stat 
Predicted Sign  
Coefficient 
 
T-Stat 
Lit ? 0.0077 2.14** ? 0.0039 0.91 ? 0.0023 0.69 
Post - 0.0046 1.18 - 0.0066 1.31 - -0.0036 -1.07 
Lit*Post - -0.0093 -1.74** - -0.0133 -2.01** - -0.0012 -0.25 
BigN - -0.0166 -1.39* - 0.0016 0.15 - 0.0022 0.32 
Client_Size ? -0.0016 -1.45* ? -0.0034 -2.30** ? -0.0056 -5.89*** 
OCF - -0.4145 -12.61*** - -0.3828 -13.72*** - -0.0935 -4.39*** 
Abs_TAC ? -0.2918 -6.36*** ? 0.2182 3.63*** ? 0.2555 8.83*** 
Lev + 0.0201 2.45*** + 0.0163 1.59* + 0.0072 1.10 
Client_Age ? 0.0003 1.34 ? 0.0003 1.09 ? -0.0001 -0.29 
Tenure - -0.0010 -1.26* - -0.0004 -0.47 - 0.0001 -0.21 
Prior_AA - 0.0090 2.13 - 0.0051 1.00 - -0.0000 -0.01 
Pr_Bank ? -0.0613 -3.96*** ? -0.1017 -5.46*** ? -0.0231 -1.73* 
Chg_NI ? 0.0005 1.21 ? 0.0000 0.05 ? -0.0005 -1.31 
New_Fin ? 0.0056 1.12 ? 0.0031 0.59 ? 0.0134 3.15** 
Loss ? -0.0115 -1.17* ? -0.0355 -7.47*** ? -0.0220 -5.30*** 
Growth ? -0.0020 -1.40 ? -0.0000 -0.23 ? 0.0041 5.16*** 
Intercept N/A 0.0756 3.39*** N/A 0.0589 3.59*** N/A 0.1255 3.81*** 
Joint Tests  Coefficient F-Stat  Coefficient F-Stat  Coefficient F-Stat 
Post + Lit*Post - -0.0047 1.62* - -0.0068 2.15* - -0.0048 2.17* 
Lit + Lit*Post - -0.0016 0.11 - -0.0095 3.05** - 0.0012 0.11 
N  1,660   524   1,660  
Adj. R-Square  0.5456   -0.3052   -0.1268  
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The results indicate that prior to litigation there was no significant difference between 
the discretionary accruals reported by clients of litigated auditors and the discretionary 
accruals reported by clients of non-litigated auditors (i.e., the coefficient on Lit is 
insignificant in all three panels). The results also indicate that there was no change following 
litigation in the discretionary accruals reported by clients of non-litigated auditors (i.e., the 
coefficient on Post is insignificant in all panels). However, in Panel A and Panel B, the 
coefficient on my interaction variable, Lit*Post, is negative and significant which indicates 
that, on average, there is a constraint of signed and positive discretionary accruals post-
litigation for litigated auditors versus non-litigated auditors. My joint test on Post + Lit*Post 
is negative and significant (in all three panels) which confirms that litigated auditors are more 
likely to constrain discretionary accruals following litigation. In addition, the joint test for Lit 
+ Lit*Post is negative and significant in Panel B which indicates that following litigation the 
total magnitude of positive discretionary accruals is lower for litigated versus non-litigated 
auditors. Taken together, these results suggest that litigation involving a single client may 
cause audit offices to constrain discretionary accruals across their entire portfolio of clients. 
Specifically, consistent with earlier results, the results from Table 14 indicate that auditor 
litigation is followed by a significant decrease in the magnitude of signed and positive 
discretionary accruals reported by all clients serviced by that audit office, but has little effect 
on the magnitude of absolute value discretionary accruals. Stated differently, audit firms 
appear to respond to litigation involving a single client by requiring more income-decreasing 
financial reporting from other clients serviced by the same office. This finding is consistent 
with the second hypothesis and suggests that litigation may, in fact, cause auditors to change 
their behavior in future reporting periods. 
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With respect to my control variables, in Panel A, I find a negative and significant 
coefficient on BigN which indicates that clients of Big N auditors report, on average, a 
smaller amount of positive discretionary accruals. My results in Table 14 also indicate that 
larger clients (Client_Size) report discretionary accruals of smaller magnitude. Consistent 
with prior literature, I find a negative association (in all Panels) between discretionary 
accruals and operating cash flows (OCF) and a positive association (in Panel A and Panel B) 
between discretionary accruals and leverage (Lev). In addition, I find that a client’s accrual 
generating potential does affect client reported discretionary accruals as the coefficient on 
Abs_TAC is significant in all three columns. The coefficient on Tenure is negative and 
significant in Panel A which confirms the findings of Myers et al. (2003) that clients with 
longer relationships with their auditors (Tenure) report discretionary accruals that are smaller 
in magnitude. In addition, I find that clients who recently issued new equity report a greater 
amount of absolute value (Panel C) discretionary accruals. This is consistent with prior 
literature that finds that managers have an incentive to increase earnings prior to equity offers 
(Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998). I also find that Growth clients evidenced by a greater 
market-to-book ratio report a greater amount of absolute value discretionary accruals (Panel 
C).  
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This is consistent with Smith and Watts (1992) who find that managers of growth 
clients tend to have more accounting discretion. However, contrary to expectations, I find 
that financially distressed clients (Pr_Bank and Loss) report discretionary accruals (in all 
panels) of smaller magnitude. Again, this unexpected result may be due to more auditor 
constraint of discretionary accruals driven by the increased litigation risk associated with 
these clients. All other control variables do not enter the models significantly. Again, my 
results on the control variables are largely consistent with the prior literature. 
Match Based on Total Assets Audited in the Prior Year where Non-litigated Auditor is from 
the Same Audit Firm 
Table 15 presents the results of Model (4) and Model (5) which estimates signed 
(Panel A and Panel B) and absolute value (Panel C) client discretionary accruals reported by 
clients of the litigated and non-litigated auditors in the two years surrounding litigation when 
the auditor match is based on total assets audited in the prior year and the non-litigated 
auditor is required to be of the same audit firm.64 Again, this model investigates whether the 
magnitude of post-litigation discretionary accruals reported by clients of litigated auditors 
differs from the magnitude of post-litigation discretionary accruals reported by clients of 
non-litigated auditors.  
                                                 
64 Because my sample includes multiple observations for a given client, my test statistics are based on Roger’s 
standard errors which are White standard errors adjusted for possible correlation of residuals within firm 
clusters (Petersen 2006). 
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6 For the absolute value and positive  discretionary accrual analysis, I use a truncated tobit regression which employs a lower (upper) bound of zero for the 
positive (negative) discretionary accrual values.  Utilizing an ordinary least squares (OLS) approach would lead to estimates biased toward zero (Greene 
2003). 
 
 
 
 
  
 TABLE 15 
Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior – 
Discretionary Accruals Reported by Clients
6
 – 
Match Based on Total Assets Audited in the Prior Year Where Non-litigated Auditor is From the Same Audit Firm 
 
Accr = β0 + β1 Lit + β2 Post + β3 Lit*Post + β4 BigN + β5 Client_Size + β6 OCF + β7 Abs_TAC + β8 Lev + β9 Client_Age + β10 Tenure + β11 Prior_AA + β12 
Pr_Bank + β13 Chg_NI + β14 New_Fin + β15 Loss + β16 Growth +β 17-31 ∑i=115 Industry + ε    (5) 
      Panel A: Signed Discretionary Accruals Panel B: Positive Discretionary Accruals Panel C: Absolute Value Discretionary Accruals 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
T-Stat 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
T-Stat 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
T-Stat 
Lit ? 0.0032 0.88 ? 0.0008 0.18 ? 0.0000 0.01 
Post - 0.0004 0.09 - -0.0052 -0.84 - 0.0015 0.39 
Lit*Post - -0.0059 -1.15 - 0.0003 0.04 - -0.0025 -0.55 
BigN - -0.0355 -1.87** - -0.0221 -1.30* - -0.0093 -0.74 
Client_Size ? -0.0021 -2.00** ? -0.0032 -2.28* ? -0.0041 -4.15*** 
OCF - -0.4476 -14.91*** - -0.3325 -13.87*** - -0.1051 -4.88*** 
Abs_TAC ? -0.2554 -5.01*** ? 0.1805 3.40*** ? 0.2897 9.46*** 
Lev + 0.0279 3.42*** + 0.0234 2.25** + 0.0074 0.96 
Client_Age ? -0.0001 -0.05 ? -0.0002 -0.90 ? -0.0004 -1.75* 
Tenure - -0.0002 0.24 - 0.0004 0.52 - 0.0002 0.36 
Prior_AA - 0.0074 1.70 - -0.0018 -0.34 - -0.0077 -1.74** 
Pr_Bank ? -0.0908 -4.89*** ? -0.0933 -4.91*** ? -0.0335 -2.43** 
Chg_NI ? 0.0006 1.35 ? 0.0000 0.06 ? 0.0001 0.20 
New_Fin ? 0.0061 1.40 ? 0.0040 0.80 ? 0.0032 0.86 
Loss ? -0.0152 -2.36** ? -0.0303 -6.57*** ? -0.0210 -4.95*** 
Growth ? -0.0024 -2.82*** ? 0.0007 0.58 ? 0.0049 5.73*** 
Intercept N/A 0.0796 0.0796 N/A 0.1080 4.95*** N/A 0.1161 5.92*** 
Joint Tests  Coefficient F-Stat  Coefficient F-Stat  Coefficient F-Stat 
Post + Lit*Post - -0.0055 3.02* - -0.0049 1.72* - -0.0011 0.13 
Lit + Lit*Post - -0.0027 0.40 - 0.0037 0.05 - -0.0025 0.47 
N  1,603   707   1,603  
Adj. R-Square  0.6108   -0.3067   -0.1270  
 
 
*, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Tests are one-tailed when signs are predicted.  All variables are defined in Table 1.  Industry controls included but not tabulated. 
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The results indicate that prior to litigation there was no significant difference between 
the discretionary accruals reported by clients of litigated auditors and the discretionary 
accruals reported by clients of non-litigated auditors (i.e., the coefficient on Lit is 
insignificant in all three panels). Panel A indicates that there was no change following 
litigation in the signed and absolute value discretionary accruals reported by clients of non-
litigated auditors (i.e., the coefficient on Post is insignificant in all panels). In all three 
panels, the coefficient on my interaction variable, Lit*Post, is insignificant which indicates 
that, on average, there is no difference in the constraint of absolute value and signed 
discretionary accruals post-litigation for litigated auditors versus non-litigated auditors. 
However, I find that, on average, there has been a significant decrease in the signed and 
positive accruals following litigation for litigated auditors, as the joint test for Post + 
Lit*Post is negative and marginally significant in Panel A and Panel B. Taken together, these 
results suggest that litigation involving a single client may cause audit offices to constrain 
accruals across their entire portfolio of clients. However, the joint test for Lit + Lit*Post is 
insignificant (in all panels) which suggests that following litigation the total magnitude of 
absolute value and signed discretionary accruals does not differ between litigated and non-
litigated auditors. To summarize the results from Table 15 as they pertain to the second 
hypothesis, auditor litigation is followed by a significant decrease in the magnitude of signed 
and positive discretionary accruals reported by all clients serviced by that audit office, but 
has no effect on the magnitude of absolute value discretionary accruals. Stated differently, 
audit firms appear to respond to litigation involving a single client by requiring more income-
decreasing financial reporting from other clients serviced by the same office. This finding is 
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consistent with the second hypothesis and suggests that litigation may, in fact, cause auditors 
to change their behavior in future reporting periods. 
With respect to my control variables, in both Panel A and Panel B, I find a negative 
and significant coefficient on BigN and Client_Size which indicates that larger clients and 
clients of Big N auditors report, on average, a smaller amount of signed and positive 
discretionary accruals. Consistent with prior literature, I find a negative association (in all 
panels) between discretionary accruals and operating cash flows (OCF) and a positive 
association (in Panel A and Panel B) between discretionary accruals and leverage (Lev). In 
addition, I find that a client’s accrual generating potential does affect client reported 
discretionary accruals as the coefficient on Abs_TAC is significant in all three columns. I also 
find that Growth clients evidenced by a greater market-to-book ratio report a greater 
(smaller) amount of absolute value (signed) discretionary accruals. This is consistent with 
Smith and Watts (1992) who find that managers of growth clients tend to have more 
accounting discretion. However, contrary to expectations, I find that financially distressed 
clients (Pr_Bank and Loss) report discretionary accruals (all panels) of smaller magnitude. 
This unexpected result may be due to more auditor constraint of discretionary accruals driven 
by the increased litigation risk associated with these clients. All other control variables do not 
enter the models significantly. Again, my results on the control variables are largely 
consistent with the prior literature. 
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Untabulated Sensitivity Analyses: Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor 
Reporting Decisions 
Match Based on Total Assets Audited in the Prior Year 
 I assess the robustness of my results by performing several sensitivity tests. First, I 
examine the discretionary accruals reported by clients of litigated and non-litigated auditors 
across a larger time period (i.e., two or three years prior to and subsequent to the litigation). 
As I lengthen the time span, I find that non-litigated auditors constrain client discretionary 
accruals while litigated auditors do not constrain discretionary accruals (and may even allow 
them to increase). Specifically, when I lengthen the time period to two years prior to and 
subsequent to the litigation, I find a constraint in positive and absolute value discretionary 
accruals by both litigated and non-litigated auditors. However, I do not find any significant 
different between the magnitude of this constraint between litigated and non-litigated 
auditors. When I lengthen the time period to three years prior to and subsequent to the 
litigation, I find a constraint in positive and signed discretionary accruals by only non-
litigated auditors. The constraint in client discretionary accruals by non-litigated auditors is 
consistent with prior literature that finds an increase in financial reporting conservatism since 
the passage of SOX (Lobo and Zhou 2006; Cohen et al. 2008). In addition, I find the 
coefficient on my interaction variable, Lit*Post, is positive and significant which indicates 
that, on average, there is an increase in the magnitude of positive discretionary accruals post-
litigation for litigated auditors versus non-litigated auditors. This finding suggests that the 
effect of auditor litigation on auditor behavior may be limited to a relatively brief time span.  
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 As my second sensitivity test, I include the financial statements issued by clients of 
litigated auditors with multiple lawsuits (and their assigned non-litigated auditor) rather than 
limiting my analysis to litigated auditors (and their assigned non-litigated auditor) with only 
one lawsuit. For the additional auditors with multiple lawsuits, I assign the litigation date 
based on the first lawsuit and then based on the most severe lawsuit.65 I then re-estimate 
model (5) for each specification. When I assign the litigation date to my sample based on the 
first lawsuit, I find results identical to my main discretionary accruals results with exception 
of the significance of the joint tests in my positive discretionary accruals analysis. 
Specifically, the joint test on Post + Lit*Post in Panel B becomes insignificant. When I 
assign the litigation date to my empirical sample based on the most severe lawsuit, I find that 
only non-litigated auditors constrain positive and signed discretionary accruals. In addition, I 
find the coefficient on my interaction variable, Lit*Post, is positive and marginally 
significant which indicates that, on average, there is an increase in the magnitude of positive 
discretionary accruals post-litigation for litigated auditors versus non-litigated auditors. This 
finding suggests that the effect of auditor litigation on auditors with multiple lawsuits may be 
limited to the first infraction. 
As my third sensitivity test, I redefine my litigation date as the date the case began rather 
than the date that the wrongdoing was made public knowledge, and I re-estimate model (5). I 
find results identical to my main discretionary accruals results with exception of the 
significance of the joint test on Lit + Lit*Post in the signed discretionary accruals analysis. 
Specifically, the joint test on Post + Lit*Post in Panel A becomes negative and significant. 
This provides additional evidence that following litigation the total magnitude of signed 
                                                 
65 I assign severity based on the size of the settlement and/or other characteristics described in the court 
documents. 
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discretionary accruals is lower for litigated versus non-litigated auditors. Overall, these 
findings suggest that redefining the litigation date as the date the case began rather than the 
date that the wrongdoing was made public knowledge has very little effect on my main 
results. 
As my fourth sensitivity test, I include the financial statements issued by clients of 
litigated auditors with meritorious lawsuits (and their assigned non-litigated auditor) only. 
Specifically, I exclude from my analysis any litigated auditor (and their assigned non-
litigated auditor) that was subsequently dismissed from the lawsuit. I then re-estimate model 
(5). As expected, my results get stronger. Specifically, I find that only litigated auditors 
constrain positive and absolute value discretionary accruals following litigation. In addition, I 
find the coefficient on my interaction variable, Lit*Post, is negative and marginally 
significant which indicates that, on average, there is an decrease in the magnitude of positive 
discretionary accruals post-litigation for litigated auditors versus non-litigated auditors. This 
finding suggests that the effect of litigation on auditor behavior is slightly more evident when 
more meritorious lawsuits are analyzed. 
As my last sensitivity test, I limit my analysis to include only the financial statements 
issued by continuing clients of litigated auditors and non-litigated auditors. In other words, I 
exclude the financial statements issued by new clients, and I re-estimate model (5). I 
eliminate these observations because Myers et al. (2003) suggest that auditors may require 
asset write-offs or impairment charges in the initial year of an audit. These charges would 
result in large absolute and negative accruals. Because I am primarily interested in the effect 
of litigation on subsequent auditor behavior, this exclusion attempts to eliminate auditor 
conservatism in the initial year of an audit. In other words, I attempt to examine the effect of 
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litigation on continuing audit engagements only. I find that both auditors constrain signed 
discretionary accruals. However, I do not find any significant different between the 
magnitude of this constraint between litigated and non-litigated auditors. In addition, I find 
that non-litigated auditors constrain positive discretionary accruals following litigation but 
litigated auditors do not. Further, I find that neither litigated nor non-litigated auditors 
constrain absolute value discretionary accruals following litigation. This finding suggests that 
the effect of auditor litigation on auditor behavior may be limited to new clients. 
Multivariate Results: Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Effort 
Match Based on Total Assets Audited in the Prior Year 
The following results present the results of model (6) which tests for a relation 
between auditor litigation and the audit report lag of subsequent audit engagements.66 This 
model investigates whether the length of time auditors spend to complete post-litigation audit 
engagements across an office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client) differs 
for litigated versus non-litigated auditors. Table 16 presents the results when the auditor 
match is based on total assets audited in the prior year.  
                                                 
66 Because my sample includes multiple observations for a given client, my test statistics are based on Roger’s 
standard errors which adjust for possible correlation of residuals within firm clusters (Peterson 2006). 
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TABLE 16 
Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior – 
Negative Binomial Regression: Audit Report Lag – 
Match Based on Total Assets Audited in the Prior Year 
 
Arl = β0 + β1 Lit + β2 Post + β3 Lit*Post + β4 BigN + β5 Client_Size + β6 Lag_Arl + β7 
Busy + β8 Restate + β9 Qualified + β10 EI + β11 ROA + β12 Prior_AA + β13 
Pr_Bank + β14 Chg_NI + β15 New_Fin + β16 Loss +β17 Growth + β 18-32 ∑i=115 
Industry + ε   (6)       
 
         
 
         *, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  
Tests are one-tailed when hypothesized signs are tabulated. 
All variables are defined in Table 1.  Industry controls included but not tabulated. 
 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
Z-Stat 
Lit ? -0.044 -1.11 
Post + -0.007 -0.29 
Lit*Post + 0.054 1.28* 
BigN ? 0.007 0.74 
Client_Size ? -0.020 -3.19*** 
Lag_Arl + 0.005 7.56*** 
Busy + 0.010 0.45 
Restate + 0.435 2.51*** 
Qualified + 0.210 3.40*** 
EI + -0.008 -0.35 
ROA - 0.180 2.17 
Prior_AA ? -0.184 -4.86*** 
Pr_Bank ? 0.162 2.35** 
Chg_NI ? -0.004 -0.72 
New_Fin ? 0.042 1.56 
Loss ? 0.071 2.25** 
Growth ? -0.006 -1.24 
Intercept N/A 3.880 55.23 
    
Joint Tests  F-Statistic  
Post + Lit*Post + 0.0462 3.12** 
Lit + Lit*Post + 0.0010 0.10 
    
N  1,781  
Wald χ2 Statistic  332.32***  
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With respect to my test variables of interest, I find that there is no significant 
difference between the ARL for clients of litigated auditors and the clients of non-litigated 
auditors prior to litigation (i.e., the coefficient on Lit is insignificant) and that there is no 
significant increase in the ARL following litigation for clients of non-litigated auditors (i.e., 
the coefficient on Post is insignificant). However, the coefficient on my interaction variable, 
Lit*Post, is positive and significant which indicates that the ARL following litigation is, on 
average, greater for clients of litigated versus clients of non-litigated auditors. Further, the 
joint test on Post + Lit*Post is positive and significant which confirms that clients of litigated 
auditors have longer ARLs after litigation than they had prior to litigation. The joint test on 
Lit + Lit*Post is insignificant which indicates that, on average, the ARL in the post-litigation 
time period does not differ for clients of litigated auditors versus clients of non-litigated 
auditors. This suggests that litigated auditors increased the time spent on audit engagements 
following litigation to an amount similar to non-litigated auditors. Overall, my results support 
the third hypothesis and indicate that auditor litigation is associated with longer ARLs on 
subsequent audit engagements across an auditor’s office-wide client portfolio (that excludes 
the litigated client). In sum, the results from Table 16 suggest that auditor litigation is 
followed by more auditor effort evidenced by an increased audit report lag. With respect to 
my control variables, the coefficients in Table 16 are largely consistent in direction and 
significance with those previously documented in the literature. I find that the auditor 
characteristics associated with increased audit complexity are positively associated with the 
ARL. Specifically, I find that financial statement restatements (Restate), qualified audit  
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opinions (Qualified), current year losses (Loss), and financially distressed clients (Pr_Bank) 
are all associated with longer ARLs. In addition, consistent with Simnett et al. (1995), I find 
that prior year ARL (Lag_Arl) is an important determinant of the current year ARL, 
indicating that ARLs are often sticky from year to year. I find that the audit report lag is 
negatively related to firm size (Client_Size) which is consistent with Ashton et al. (1989). 
Lastly, while I made no directional prediction, I find that prior Arthur Andersen clients 
(Prior_AA) are associated with shorter ARLs. All other control variables do not enter the 
model significantly. Overall, my results on the control variables are largely consistent with 
the prior literature. 
Match Based on Total Clients Audited in the Prior Year 
Table 17 presents the results of model (6) which tests for a relation between auditor 
litigation and the audit report lag of subsequent audit engagements when the auditor match is 
based on total clients audited in the prior year.  
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TABLE 17 
Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior – 
Negative Binomial Regression: Audit Report Lag – 
Match Based on Total Clients Audited in the Prior Year 
 
Arl = β0 + β1 Lit + β2 Post + β3 Lit*Post + β4 BigN + β5 Client_Size + β6 Lag_Arl + β7 
Busy + β8 Restate + β9 Qualified + β10 EI + β11 ROA + β12 Prior_AA + β13 
Pr_Bank + β14 Chg_NI + β15 New_Fin + β16 Loss +β17 Growth + β 18-32 ∑i=115 
Industry + ε   (6)       
 
         
 
         *, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  
Tests are one-tailed when hypothesized signs are tabulated. 
All variables are defined in Table 1.  Industry controls included but not tabulated. 
 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
Z-Stat 
Lit ? -0.027 -0.85 
Post + 0.044 1.44* 
Lit*Post + 0.043 0.99 
BigN ? -0.065 -1.89* 
Client_Size ? -0.007 -0.95 
Lag_Arl + 0.007 9.95*** 
Busy + 0.028 1.11 
Restate + 0.266 1.14 
Qualified + 0.293 4.09*** 
EI + -0.038 -0.97 
ROA - 0.083 1.56 
Prior_AA ? -0.084 -2.13** 
Pr_Bank ? 0.0599 1.08 
Chg_NI ? 0.004 0.93 
New_Fin ? 0.046 1.29 
Loss ? 0.062 1.93* 
Growth ? -0.003 -0.63 
Intercept N/A 3.71 44.57*** 
    
Joint Tests  F-Statistic  
Post + Lit*Post + 0.088 7.24*** 
Lit + Lit*Post + 0.016 0.27 
    
N  1,792  
Wald χ2 Statistic  306.67***  
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With respect to my test variables of interest, I find that there is no significant 
difference between the ARL for clients of litigated auditors and for clients non-litigated 
auditors prior to litigation (i.e., the coefficient on Lit is insignificant). I find that there is a 
significant increase in the ARL following litigation for clients of non-litigated auditors (i.e., 
the coefficient on Post is positive and significant). I also find that the coefficient on my 
interaction variable, Lit*Post, is insignificant which indicates that the ARL following 
litigation, on average, does not differ for clients of litigated versus clients of non-litigated 
auditors. The joint test on Lit + Lit*Post is insignificant which confirms this result and 
indicates that, on average, the ARL in the post-litigation time period does not differ for 
clients of litigated auditors versus clients of non-litigated auditors. However, the joint test on 
Post + Lit*Post is positive and significant which indicates that clients of litigated auditors 
have longer ARLs after litigation than they had prior to litigation. This suggests that both 
litigated and non-litigated auditors increased the time spent on audit engagements following 
litigation and that this increase did not differ between the two groups of auditors. Overall, my 
results when litigated auditors are matched to non-litigated auditors based on the number of 
clients audited in the prior year do not support the third hypothesis. In sum, the results from 
Table 17 suggest that auditor litigation is not followed by more auditor effort evidenced by 
an increased audit report lag. With respect to my control variables, the coefficients in Table 
17 are similiar in direction and significance with those in Table 16. Specifically, the 
coefficients on Lag_ARL, Qualified, and Prior_AA retain their sign and significance. 
However, I find that the coefficients on Client_Size, Restate, and Pr_Bank retain their sign 
but become insignificant. In addition, similar to Leventis et al. (2005), I find that the ARL of 
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Big N (BigN) clients is shorter than the ARL of non-Big N clients. These results indicate that 
the audits associated with increased complexity (i.e., Qualified) and financially distressed 
clients (i.e., Loss) are positively associated with the ARL and audits involving larger auditors 
(BigN) are associated with shorter ARLs. In sum, when the auditor match is based on total 
clients audited in the prior year, I find results largely consistent with the prior literature. 
However, the significance of the control variables varies when I use different matching 
procedures.  
Match Based on Total Assets Audited in the Prior Year where Non-litigated Auditor is from 
the Same Audit Firm 
Table 18 presents the results of model (6) which tests for a relation between auditor 
litigation and the audit report lag of subsequent audit engagements when the auditor match is 
based on total assets audited in the prior year and the non-litigated auditor is required to be of 
the same audit firm.  
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TABLE 18 
Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor Behavior – 
Negative Binomial Regression: Audit Report Lag – 
Match Based on Total Assets Audited in the Prior Year Where Non-litigated Auditor is 
From the Same Audit Firm 
 
Arl = β0 + β1 Lit + β2 Post + β3 Lit*Post + β4 BigN + β5 Client_Size + β6 Lag_Arl + β7 Busy + β8 
Restate + β9 Qualified + β10 EI + β11 ROA + β12 Prior_AA + β13 Pr_Bank + β14 Chg_NI + 
β15 New_Fin + β16 Loss +β17 Growth + β 18-32 ∑i=115 Industry + ε   (6)       
 
         
 
         *, **, *** indicate significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  
Tests are one-tailed when hypothesized signs are tabulated. 
All variables are defined in Table 1.  Industry controls included but not tabulated. 
 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
 
Z-Stat 
Lit ? 0.105 3.39*** 
Post + 0.047 1.38* 
Lit*Post + -0.025 -0.59 
BigN ? -0.035 -0.85 
Client_Size ? -0.011 -1.82* 
Lag_Arl + 0.007 8.86*** 
Busy + -0.002 -0.07 
Restate + 0.322 1.84** 
Qualified + 0.211 3.08*** 
EI + -0.028 -0.79 
ROA - 0.162 2.20 
Prior_AA ? -0.126 -3.46*** 
Pr_Bank ? 0.132 2.39** 
Chg_NI ? 0.007 1.32* 
New_Fin ? 0.066 2.13** 
Loss ? 0.492 1.51 
Growth ? -0.009 -1.94** 
Intercept N/A 3.640 46.99*** 
    
Joint Tests  Coefficient F-Statistic 
Post + Lit*Post + 0.0219 0.66 
Lit + Lit*Post + 0.0800 5.99** 
    
N  1,738  
Wald χ2 
Statistic 
 404.61***  
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With respect to my test variables of interest, I find that, prior to litigation, the ARL 
for clients of litigated auditors is longer than the ARL for clients of non-litigated auditors 
(i.e., the coefficient on Lit is positive and significant). I find that there is a significant 
increase in the ARL following litigation for clients of non-litigated auditors (i.e., the 
coefficient on Post is positive and significant). I also find that the coefficient on my 
interaction variable, Lit*Post, is insignificant which indicates that the ARL following 
litigation, on average, does not differ for clients of litigated versus clients of non-litigated 
auditors. The joint test on Lit + Lit*Post is positive and significant which indicates that, on 
average, the ARL in the post-litigation time period is greater for clients of litigated auditors 
versus clients of non-litigated auditors. However, the joint test on Post + Lit*Post is positive 
and insignificant which indicates that clients of litigated auditors do not have longer ARLs 
after litigation than they had prior to litigation. This suggests that non-litigated auditors 
increased the time spent on audit engagements following litigation, but litigated auditors did 
not. However, the total time spend on audit engagements following litigation was greater for 
litigated versus non-litigated auditors. Overall, my results when litigated auditors are 
matched to non-litigated auditors based on the amount of assets audited in the prior year 
when the non-litigated auditor is required to be of the same audit firm do not support the 
third hypothesis. In sum, the results from Table 18 suggest that auditor litigation is not 
followed by more auditor effort evidenced by an increased audit report lag. 
With respect to my control variables, the coefficients in Table 18 are largely 
consistent in direction and significance with those previously documented in the literature. I 
find that the auditor characteristics associated with increased audit complexity are positively 
associated with the ARL. Specifically, I find that financial statement restatements (Restate), 
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qualified audit opinions (Qualified), clients with a greater change in net income (Chg_NI), 
clients issuing new equity (New_Fin,) and financially distressed clients (Pr_Bank) are all 
associated with longer ARLs. In addition, consistent with Simnett et al. (1995), I find that 
prior year ARL (Lag_Arl) is an important determinant of the current year ARL, indicating 
that ARLs are often sticky from year to year. I find that the audit report lag is negatively 
related to firm size (Client_Size) which is consistent with Ashton et al. (1989). While I made 
no directional prediction, I find that prior Arthur Andersen clients (Prior_AA) and clients 
with greater sales growth (Growth) are associated with shorter ARLs. All other control 
variables do not enter the model significantly. Overall, my results on the control variables are 
largely consistent with the prior literature. 
Untabulated Sensitivity Analyses: Effect of Auditor Litigation on Subsequent Auditor 
Effort 
Match Based on Total Assets Audited in the Prior Year 
 I assess the robustness of my results by performing several sensitivity tests. First, I 
examine the audit report lag for clients of litigated and non-litigated auditors across a larger 
time period (i.e., two or three years prior to and subsequent to the litigation). As I lengthen 
the time span, I find that the ARL for clients of both litigated and non-litigated auditors 
increases following litigation, and I find some evidence that the increase is greater for clients 
of litigated auditors. Specifically, when I lengthen the time period to two years prior to and 
subsequent to the litigation, I find an increase in the ARL for clients of litigated and non-
litigated auditors, and I do not find any significant difference in the increase between clients 
of litigated and non-litigated auditors. In other words, I find the coefficient on Post and the 
coefficient on joint test on Post + Lit*Post to be positive and significant, but the coefficient 
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on my interaction variable, Lit*Post, to be insignificant. However, when I lengthen the time 
period to three years prior to and subsequent to the litigation, I find an increase in the ARL 
for clients of litigated and non-litigated auditors, and I find the increase to be greater for 
clients of litigated auditors. Specifically, I find the coefficient on Post, the coefficient on the 
joint test on Post + Lit*Post, and the coefficient on my interaction variable, Lit*Post, to be 
positive and significant. In sum, these results indicate that, on average, there is an increase in 
the ARL for clients of litigated and non-litigated auditors following litigation. However, this 
increase is greater for clients of litigated auditors when the time span is lengthened. 
 As my second sensitivity test, I examine the ARL for clients of litigated auditors with 
multiple lawsuits (and their assigned non-litigated auditor) rather than limiting my analysis to 
clients of litigated auditors (and their assigned non-litigated auditor) with only one lawsuit. 
For the additional auditors with multiple lawsuits, I assign the litigation date based on the 
first lawsuit and then based on the most severe lawsuit.67 I then re-estimate model (6) for 
each specification. When I assign the litigation date to my sample based on the first lawsuit, I 
find results identical to my main ARL results with exception of the significance of the joint 
test on Lit + Lit*Post. Specifically, the joint test on Lit + Lit*Post becomes positive and 
marginally significant which indicates that the post-litigation ARL for clients of litigated 
auditors is longer versus clients of non-litigated auditors. This result further supports my fifth 
hypothesis. When I assign the litigation date to my empirical sample based on the most 
severe lawsuit, I find results identical to the results when the litigation date is based on the 
first lawsuit with exception of the significance of Post. Specifically, the coefficient on Post is 
negative and marginally significant. This indicates that, on average, the post-litigation ARL 
                                                 
67 I assign severity based on the size of the settlement and/or other characteristics described in the court 
documents. 
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for clients of litigated auditors is longer while the post-litigation ARL for clients of non-
litigated auditors is shorter. This finding suggests that the effect of auditor litigation on 
auditor effort is not limited to auditors with multiple lawsuits. 
As my third sensitivity test, I redefine my litigation date as the date the case began 
rather than the date that the wrongdoing was made public knowledge, and I re-estimate 
model (6). I find results identical to my main ARL results with exception of the significance 
of the joint test on Lit + Lit*Post. Specifically, the joint test on Post + Lit*Post in Panel A 
becomes positive and marginally significant. This provides additional evidence that 
following litigation the ARL for clients of litigated auditors increased. Overall, these findings 
suggest that redefining the litigation date as the date the case began rather than the date that the 
wrongdoing was made public knowledge has very little effect on my main ARL results. 
As my fourth sensitivity test, I include the ARLs for clients of litigated auditors with 
meritorious lawsuits (and their assigned non-litigated auditor) only. Specifically, I exclude 
from my analysis any litigated auditor (and their assigned non-litigated auditor) that was 
subsequently dismissed from the lawsuit. I then re-estimate model (6). I find no change in the 
ARL for clients of litigated or clients of non-litigated auditors following litigation. 
Specifically, I find the coefficients on Post, Lit*Post, and on both joint tests to be 
insignificant. This finding suggests that the effect of litigation on auditor behavior is less 
evident when my sample includes only meritorious lawsuits. 
As my last sensitivity test, I limit my analysis to include only the ARLs for 
continuing clients of litigated auditors and non-litigated auditors. In other words, I exclude 
the financial statements issued by new clients, and I re-estimate model (6). I eliminate these 
observations because prior research suggests that auditor behavior may differ on initial 
engagements (e.g., Simon and Francis 1988; Myers et al. 2003). Because I am primarily 
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interested in the effect of litigation on subsequent auditor behavior, this exclusion attempts to 
examine the effect of litigation on continuing audit engagements only.  
My results are identical to my main ARL results. I find that there is no significant 
difference between the ARL for clients of litigated auditors and the clients of non-litigated 
auditors prior to litigation (i.e., the coefficient on Lit is insignificant) and that there is no 
significant increase in the ARL following litigation for clients of non-litigated auditors (i.e., 
the coefficient on Post is insignificant). However, the coefficient on my interaction variable, 
Lit*Post, is positive and significant which indicates that the ARL following litigation is, on 
average, greater for clients of litigated versus clients of non-litigated auditors. Further, the 
joint test on Post + Lit*Post is positive and significant which confirms that clients of litigated 
auditors have longer ARLs after litigation than they had prior to litigation. The joint test on 
Lit + Lit*Post is insignificant which indicates that, on average, the ARL in the post-litigation 
time period does not differ for clients of litigated auditors versus clients of non-litigated 
auditors. This suggests that litigated auditors increased the time spent on audit engagements 
following litigation to an amount similar to non-litigated auditors. Overall, my main ARL 
results, that support the third hypothesis, are robust to inclusion of continuing clients only. 
This suggests that auditor litigation is followed by a longer ARL for all clients, not just new 
clients. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
Motivated by recent calls to limit auditor legal liability and the potential for auditor 
legal liability to act as a deterrence mechanism against non-GAAP financial reporting, I 
examine the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to annual financial 
statement misstatements and the effect of auditor misstatement-based litigation on 
subsequent auditor behavior. I find that several measures of misstatement severity are 
positively associated with the likelihood that a misstatement results in auditor litigation. 
Specifically, I find that auditor litigation is more likely to follow misstatements that are 
associated with fraud, regulatory investigations, and/or larger stock price declines at the 
misstatement disclosure date. In addition, I find that litigation is more likely to follow 
misstatements associated with a greater number of accounting rule application (i.e. 
FASB/GAAP) failures, especially when the failures involve revenue recognition. With 
respect to auditor characteristics, I find that the likelihood that a misstatement results in 
auditor litigation is greater when engagement fees consist of a greater magnitude or a greater 
proportion of non-audit service fees. This result suggests that the amount of non-audit 
services provided by an auditor may affect the perceived auditor independence and perceived 
audit quality associated with accounting misstatements. However, my tests also reveal that 
this relationship only exists in the post-Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) time period. Thus, the 
perception of non-audit services to impair independence directly corresponds with the SOX 
prohibition of certain non-audit services,68 and suggests that the SOX emphasis on the 
                                                 
68 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 prohibits audit firms from providing any of the following services to a 
publicly traded audit client: (1) bookkeeping and related services; (2) design or implementation of financial 
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potential of non-audit services to impair auditor independence may have consequently 
affected how non-audit services are viewed by marketplace participants. My tests do not find 
auditor tenure to significantly influence the likelihood that a misstatement results in auditor 
litigation. However, my tests do reveal that, after controlling for other determinants, 
misstatements by Big N auditors are less likely to result in litigation than misstatements by 
non-Big N auditors. These findings suggest that the perception that longer auditor-client 
relationships are associated with higher quality audits may not apply to litigation associated 
with misstatements. However, the perception that Big N auditors provide higher quality 
audits than non-Big N auditors may apply to litigation associated with misstatements. 
Overall, these results suggest that misstatement severity and several auditor characteristics 
affect auditor culpability for past misstatements.  
With respect to client characteristics, I find that the likelihood that a misstatement 
results in auditor litigation is greater (smaller) for larger (older) clients and greater for those 
clients that file for bankruptcy within a year following the misstatement. These results are 
similar to Carcello and Palmrose (1994) and suggest that larger clients may either have more 
shareholders who are willing to pursue litigation or may have suffered a greater total loss to 
incentivize the pursuit of litigation. These results also suggest that shareholders of older 
clients may have less incentive to pursue auditor litigation. Finally, consistent with the prior 
literature, these results indicate that client bankruptcy is a frequent source of auditor litigation 
(e.g., Palmrose 1987; Carcello and Palmrose 2004).  
I then investigate the circumstances where auditor misstatement-based litigation 
results in an auditor settlement. I find that misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs’ 
                                                                                                                                                       
information systems; (3) appraisal or valuation services; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit outsourcing; (6) 
management or human resources services; (7) investment or broker/dealer services; (8) legal and expert services 
(SOX 2002). 
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claims to be the primary drivers of auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based 
litigation. Specifically, I find that misstatement-based litigation is more likely to result in an 
auditor settlement when the misstatement involves fraud. However, I do not find the other 
measures of misstatement severity to be positively associated with the likelihood of an 
auditor settlement. Rather, I find that misstatement-based litigation is more likely to result in 
an auditor settlement when the amount of alleged income or equity inflation is greater and/or 
when the alleged percentage drop in share price over the class action period is more severe. 
These results are consistent with the views of Advisory Committee members who favor 
auditor legal liability reform and who believe that audit “firms are forced to settle 
cases…because the size of the claims mean that if the firm does not prevail at trial, the 
resulting award could destroy the firm” (Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession 
2008,  VII:27).   
In addition, I find that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based 
litigation is less likely in the post-SOX time period and when there is a greater diffusion of 
shareholders. These results suggest that the majority of settlements occurred prior to SOX 
and that a greater diffusion of shareholders makes an agreed-upon settlement more difficult 
to obtain. I also find that auditor settlements are more likely to result from misstatements 
issued by clients who recently issued an IPO. This suggests that the increased liability burden 
that auditors must bear under the Securities Act of 1933 affects the likelihood of an auditor to 
settle misstatement-based litigation.69 I do not find any of the other auditor characteristics to 
be associated with an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation in the 
hypothesized direction. These insignificant results suggest that the characteristics of the 
                                                 
69 Auditors are liable for any level of negligence under the Securities Act of 1933 whereas auditors are only 
liable for scienter or gross negligence under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Act of 1934. 
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auditor (e.g., engagement fees, auditor tenure, and auditor size) may be less important in 
predicting the likelihood that an auditor settlement results from misstatement-based litigation 
than in predicting the likelihood that auditor litigation results from a financial statement 
misstatement.70  
With respect to the effect of litigation on subsequent auditor behavior, I find evidence 
that auditors employed at a litigated office engage in more conservative behavior following 
litigation. Specifically, I find that, in the year following litigation, litigated auditors are more 
likely than non-litigated auditors to constrain signed and positive discretionary accruals 
across their office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client). My results suggest 
that, following litigation, auditors require more conservative financial reporting from their 
clients by constraining client income-increasing financial reporting behavior. In addition to 
the discretionary accruals results, I find that in the year following litigation, litigated auditors 
have longer post-litigation ARLs than do non-litigated auditors. These findings suggest that 
litigation increases the amount of time auditors spend on subsequent audit engagements 
(again, across the auditor’s office-wide client portfolio that excludes the litigated client). 
Combined, these findings suggest that, with respect to the reporting of accruals and the time 
spent on an audit, auditor litigation does seem to influence the behavior of auditors. 
My study provides evidence useful to regulators and auditors. Specifically, when 
assessing the current level of auditor legal liability, regulators may wish to understand the 
circumstances under which auditors are held liable for past audit failures and how litigation 
may affect subsequent auditor behavior (which ultimately may impact financial reporting 
quality). Because of the reputational and financial cost of lawsuits, auditors may be interested 
in these findings because they address the amount of accountability assigned to an auditor for 
                                                 
70 However, this conclusion is tenuous because it relies on a null finding. 
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a past misstatement. My results indicate that misstatement severity and the composition of 
engagement fees are primary drivers of misstatement-based auditor litigation. Although 
auditor litigation is a relatively rare occurrence, my study also provides evidence that such 
litigation may have the potential to temporarily deter future non-GAAP reporting. 
           Specifically, my results indicate that auditor behavior becomes more conservative in the  
year following litigation but, on average, does not change over a longer time span. These results 
suggest that auditor litigation may play a role in maintaining audit quality. However, I also 
find evidence that misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs’ claims are primary 
drivers of auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based litigation. This finding is 
consistent with those who favor liability reform because they believe that audit firms are 
forced to settle lawsuits when the unpredictable risk of loss becomes too great. Overall, my 
study provides evidence that auditor culpability for past financial statement misstatements is 
associated with misstatement severity, various auditor characteristics, and the alleged losses 
associated with misstatements. While auditor litigation does play a role in maintaining audit 
quality, it also subjects auditors to potential damages that could have a significant impact on 
the survival of the audit firm.  
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